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I. Introduction 
The Arizona State quarterback wearing number “9” on 
Electronic Arts’ NCAA Football 2005 video game is a 6′4″, 235-
pound specimen of an athlete.1 He wears a black wristband on his 
right throwing arm and a white quarterback wristband on his 
left.2 His uniform includes the “Nike swoosh” on the left shoulder 
just to the side of the jersey’s gold collar.3 The quarterback’s 
maroon helmet has a gold stripe down the center and features a 
facemask resembling a “Schutt OPO,” the design currently worn 
by National Football League (NFL) quarterbacks Tom Brady and 
Tony Romo.4 
                                                                                                     
 1. See NCAA FOOTBALL 2005 (Electronic Arts, Inc. 2004) (showing this 
character as a toned, fit player). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Greg Hanlon, Nine of a Kind: Grills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2012/01/15/magazine/nine-of-a-kind-
football-helmets.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that quarterbacks favor 
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The Rutgers University quarterback wearing the number 
“13” jersey appears equally lifelike in this same game.5 He is a bit 
smaller than his Arizona State counterpart, listed in the game at 
6′2″, 197 pounds.6 He wears two white wristbands and has a 
similar “Nike swoosh” on his left shoulder.7 His facemask 
resembles the lightweight “Schutt OPO-SW” that is also popular 
among professional quarterbacks.8 It is nearly impossible to miss 
his thick eye black.9 
A college football fan who plays the game and is familiar with 
Sam Keller will certainly recognize Arizona State’s number “9” as 
representing Keller, and anyone not familiar with Keller can 
clearly see the similarity between his picture and the image used 
in NCAA Football. Ryan Hart, the Rutgers quarterback, is 
equally identifiable in the game, down to the remarkably similar 
skin tone. The characters in the game, while not identified as 
Keller and Hart by name, have the same biological statistics, 
home states, and playing styles as the real quarterbacks who 
both had moderately successful college football careers but who 
were by no means All-Americans.10 
                                                                                                     
this facemask because of its “large ‘view-box’”) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 5. NCAA FOOTBALL 2005, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Hanlon, supra note 4 (noting that quarterbacks like Aaron Rodgers 
prefer this facemask because it is lightweight). 
 9. NCAA FOOTBALL 2005, supra note 1. 
 10. See Sam Keller Stats, SPORTS REFERENCE, http://www.sports-
reference.com/cfb/players/sam-keller-1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting 
that Keller accumulated forty touchdown passes and almost 5,500 passing yards 
in three seasons at Arizona State and one at Nebraska, and that he is famous 
for starting his first game in the 2004 Sun Bowl where he led the Sun Devils to 
a comeback victory over Purdue) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review); Ryan Hart Stats, SPORTS REFERENCE, http://www.sports-
reference.com/cfb/players/ryan-hart-1.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting 
that Hart finished with fifty-two touchdown passes and nearly 8,500 passing 
yards in four years playing for the Scarlet Knights, leading the Big East in pass 
completions and completion percentage during his junior year in 2004) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Neither athlete played in the 
National Football League. See Sam Keller, NFL PLAYERS, http://www. 
nfl.com/player/samkeller/770/profile (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) (noting that 
Keller played zero NFL seasons and has no NFL statistics) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review); Ryan Hart News, Rumors and Stats, KFFL, 
http://www.kffl.com/player/14562/nfl/ryan-hart (last visited Jan. 27, 2015) 
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Both Keller and Hart sued Electronic Arts for violating their 
rights of publicity.11 The right of publicity is a common-law 
doctrine that some states have statutorily adopted.12 Although 
defined differently by the states that recognize it, the right of 
publicity is broadly recognized as an individual’s right to protect 
her name and persona from commercial exploitation.13 The issue 
in Keller’s and Hart’s cases is whether the First Amendment 
right to free speech protects Electronic Arts’ use of the plaintiffs’ 
likenesses in the NCAA Football games or whether the former 
athletes’ publicity rights outweigh Electronic Arts’ constitutional 
interests.14 The Third and Ninth Circuits recently held in Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, Inc.15 and In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & 
Likeness Licensing Litigation (Keller),16 respectively, that 
Electronic Arts violated Hart’s and Keller’s rights of publicity.17  
The amount of attention devoted to video game cases in 
recent right of publicity scholarship reveals that the video game 
                                                                                                     
(noting that the New York Giants cut Hart after minicamp in 2006) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 11. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (D.N.J. 2011); In re 
NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Litig. (Keller), No. C 09–1967 CW, 
2010 WL 5644656, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2010). 
 12. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 441 (6th Cir. 2003) (noting 
that the right of publicity is a state-based common law doctrine and is distinct 
from the federal Lanham Act, a federal trademark law); infra notes 83–84 
(listing the states that have adopted the right of publicity either by statute or 
through common law). 
 13. See, e.g., Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (noting that the right of publicity under Georgia law is “[an 
individual’s] right to the exclusive use of his or her name and likeness” (quoting 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 
296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982))). 
 14. See Hart, 808 F. Supp. 2d at 771 (framing the issue as “whether the 
First Amendment grants EA the right to impinge upon Plaintiff’s New Jersey 
common law right of publicity”); Keller, 2010 WL 5644656, at *1 (framing the 
issue as whether Electronic Arts, the NCAA, and the Collegiate Licensing 
Company “conspired to deprive [the plaintiffs] of their rights of publicity”). 
 15. 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 16. 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 17. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (concluding that Electronic Arts’ games did 
not “sufficiently transform” Hart’s likeness and that Electronic Arts thus 
violated Hart’s right of publicity); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271 (affirming the district 
court’s judgment that the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim trumped Electronic 
Arts’ First Amendment interests). 
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context is a hot-button area in need of consistency.18 As Rhonda 
Trotter notes, “With the rapid growth of the videogame industry 
in recent years, videogames have become fertile ground for right 
of publicity claims stemming from unauthorized use of a 
celebrity’s persona.”19 Applying the right of publicity in the video 
game context is relatively new because the right of publicity 
predates video games.20 Hart and Keller, however, are not the 
first of their kind.21 In previous right of publicity cases in the 
video game context, courts have primarily considered and applied 
three tests: the Rogers22 test, the transformative use test, and the 
predominant use test.23  
Scholars and judges have criticized each test, and courts 
disagree on what test to use in the video game context.24 As 
Jordan Blanke observes, “Even when courts apply the same test 
to the same facts, results are inconsistent.”25 The opposite 
                                                                                                     
 18. See 3 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 24:4 (2013) 
(describing the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment 
and devoting significant attention to the video game context in discussing the 
cases and the three major tests). 
 19. Rhonda R. Trotter, Issues in Music, Television, and Videogame 
Litigation in the Digital Age, ASPATORE, Dec. 2013, at 5. 
 20. See Alan Wilcox, Regulating Violence in Video Games: Virtually 
Everything, 31 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 253, 256–57 (2011) 
(discussing the origin of video games, noting that scholars disagree on what the 
first video game actually was, and describing how early video games were 
unsophisticated).  
 21. See infra Part III.B (describing three other important video game right 
of publicity cases from 2006, 2008, and 2011). 
 22. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 23. See infra Part III (describing the origins, specifics, and application of 
each test). 
 24. See Charles Bahlert, College Football, Electronic Arts, and the Right of 
Publicity: Reality-Mimicking Run Amok, 18 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 149, 158–66 
(2014) (criticizing each of the existing tests); Jordan M. Blanke, No Doubt About 
It—You’ve Got to Have Hart: Simulation Video Games May Redefine the Balance 
Between and Among the Right of Publicity, the First Amendment, and Copyright 
Law, 19 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 26, 63 (2013) (noting that different courts apply 
different tests). 
 25. Blanke, supra note 24, at 63; see also Bahlert, supra note 24, at 155 
(“First Amendment challenges to the right of publicity have led to a number of 
disparate tests and subsequent unpredictable results.”); Joseph Gutmann, Note, 
It’s in the Game: Redefining the Transformative Use Test for the Video Game 
Arena, 31 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 222 (2012) (“Courts deciding on the 
same video game have come to different conclusions despite using the same 
test.”); Alex Wyman, Defining the Modern Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. REV. ENT. 
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outcomes at the district court level in Hart and Keller highlight 
this inconsistency and uncertainty.26 The number of tests and 
inconsistent application of each test spawn many problems, 
including a decreased incentive for creating video games because 
companies cannot anticipate whether their products will violate 
an individual’s right of publicity.27 The result of these problems 
is, as Timothy Bucher observes, that “something must be done, 
and soon, to reroute the right of publicity and First Amendment 
jurisprudence” as it relates to cases like those discussed in this 
Note.28 Although scholars have suggested different approaches to 
remedy the problems,29 the recent NCAA Football decisions 
necessitate reevaluating the current tests and possible 
alternatives. 
                                                                                                     
& SPORTS L. 167, 167 (2014) (“[T]he framework for litigating this right has 
become impossibly muddled. . . . The consequences of this confusion are far-
reaching and have become more troubling as the right of publicity has 
expanded.”). Alex Wyman asserts that the variation among different states’ 
right of publicity laws is a large contributor to the confusion. “Primarily, these 
problems result from varied approaches taken by both state and federal courts 
in addressing right of publicity claims. . . . [T]he right of publicity is 
inconsistently applied because its regulation has been delegated to the states.” 
Id. at 168. 
 26. See Timothy J. Bucher, Game On: Sports-Related Games and the 
Contentious Interplay Between the Right of Publicity and the First Amendment, 
14 TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 19 (2012) (arguing that the different district 
court outcomes in Hart and Keller “demonstrate the need for the Supreme Court 
to set forth a clear standard so that courts can consistently determine the 
appropriate interplay between the right of publicity and the First Amendment”); 
Gutmann, supra note 25, at 248 (“Even the most popular test is unequipped to 
deal with modern issues such as video games, leading to completely 
contradictory opinions like Keller and Hart.”). 
 27. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 151 (“Unpredictability creates a chilling 
effect at the clearance level and barricades otherwise protected speech behind a 
wall of uncertainty.”). Susannah M. Rooney, Note, Just Another Brown-Eyed 
Girl: Toward a Limited Federal Right of Publicity Under the Lanham Act in a 
Digital Age of Celebrity Dominance, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 921, 941 (2013) (“These 
tests are applied inconsistently, and consequently, creators cannot confidently 
determine whether their works will fall within the realm of the protected speech 
or will infringe on the right of publicity. This issue implicates free speech 
concerns because it serves to effectively chill some forms of creative speech.”). 
 28. Bucher, supra note 26, at 22. 
 29. See infra Part IV (describing many alternative approaches including 
Joseph Gutmann’s suggested “redefined transformative test” that classifies a 
game as either an altered reality or an imitation of life). 
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This Note reexamines the three major existing alternatives 
and concludes that none of them is an effective standard that 
courts can apply consistently.30 It addresses this problem by 
proposing an alternative test that will be easier for courts to 
apply consistently, will protect video game producers’ reasonable 
expectations, and is designed specifically for balancing the right 
of publicity with the First Amendment in the video game 
context.31 
Part II discusses the development of the right of publicity, 
the right’s origin, its policy justifications, and how it differs in 
various states.32 Part III outlines the major right of publicity 
precedent, including both the foundational right of publicity cases 
and those in the video game context.33 Part IV examines scholars’ 
suggestions for resolving the inconsistencies in right of publicity 
cases.34 Part V establishes this Note’s suggested approach, the 
readily identifiable standard, and explains how a court applying 
this standard would evaluate the video game cases addressed in 
Part III.B.35 
II. The Right of Publicity: Origin, History, and Development 
A. Source of the Right 
The Second Circuit coined the term “right of publicity” in its 
1953 opinion Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 
Inc.36 The Haelan court considered two parties’ competing claims 
that they owned exclusive rights to use a baseball player’s 
photograph to help sell gum.37 The defendant contended that the 
                                                                                                     
 30. See infra Part V.A (explaining why none of the three currently 
considered tests solve the problem). 
 31. See infra Part V.B (introducing the readily identifiable standard and 
explaining how it accomplishes these goals). 
 32. Infra Part II. 
 33. Infra Part III. 
 34. Infra Part IV. 
 35. Infra Part V. 
 36. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 
(2d Cir. 1953) (introducing the term). 
 37. See id. at 867 (noting that the baseball player had entered into two 
exclusive contracts with rival gum manufacturers of the same type and 
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baseball player had only a right of privacy interest in his 
picture.38 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and found 
instead that “a man has a right in the publicity value of his 
photograph.”39 The court distinguished the right of publicity from 
privacy rights, which are neither assignable nor economic in 
nature.40 It reasoned that this new right was necessary to protect 
celebrities’ ability to profit from their own identities and claimed 
that New York precedent, including the famous Wood v. Lucy, 
Lady Duff-Gordon,41 provided a basis for the right.42 
Melville B. Nimmer unraveled what a right of publicity 
should look like a year later in his article The Right of Publicity. 
Nimmer examined the right of privacy, unfair competition, and 
other doctrines and concluded that these theories inadequately 
protected a celebrity’s right to profit from her image.43 He noted 
that the judiciary had not yet recognized the right of publicity 
other than in Haelan but agreed with the Haelan court that 
existing precedent “indicated a judicial willingness to extend 
protection to publicity values which would not be protect[a]ble 
under the traditional legal theories.”44 Nimmer thus advocated 
that future courts create a right of publicity that accounted for 
both “the economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in 
                                                                                                     
considering which company had the right to use the player’s image). 
 38. See id. at 868 (explaining the defendant’s argument that “a man has no 
legal interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of privacy”). 
 39. See id. (“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’”). 
 40. See id. (explaining that the right of publicity is “in addition to and 
independent of that right to privacy”). 
 41. 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917). Then-Judge Cardozo concluded in this brief 
opinion that an agreement between an employer and employee contained an 
implied promise that amounted to a contract because the writing was “instinct 
with an obligation, imperfectly expressed.” Id. at 214 (internal quotations 
omitted). The case has since become “one of the most enduring and influential 
cases in the contracts pantheon.” James J. Fishman, The Enduring Legacy of 
Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 162, 162 (2008). 
 42. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 
(2d Cir. 1953) (noting the need to protect “prominent persons” like entertainers 
and athletes and arguing that multiple New York cases supported the court’s 
position). 
 43. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 203, 204–15 (1954) (insisting that each of these doctrines has flaws that 
prohibit them from fully protecting what a right of publicity will protect). 
 44. Id. at 218. 
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publicity” and “the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in 
protecting such publicity values.”45 
B. Defining the Right of Publicity 
As noted above, Haelan coined the right of publicity as a 
right distinct from that of privacy.46 The main distinction 
between the rights of publicity and privacy is that the right of 
publicity protects an “individual’s persona” whereas the right of 
privacy safeguards “conventional work[s] of authorship” among 
other more general privacy interests.47 Although the right of 
publicity protects both celebrities and noncelebrities,48 it is 
invoked almost exclusively by celebrities because people who are 
not famous face a much lower risk of economic exploitation of 
their personas.49 It thus makes sense that the right of publicity 
originated as Americans’ fascination with celebrities began to 
take off.50 The right to privacy, conversely, is often used by both 
                                                                                                     
 45. Id. at 215. 
 46. See Haelan, 202 F.2d at 868 (explaining that the court was creating the 
right of publicity in addition to the existing right of privacy). 
 47. ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A 
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES 34 (2010). 
 48. See Waits v. Frito–Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(concluding that the right of publicity protects individuals “who fall short of 
superstardom”); Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 386 (W.D. 
Ky. 1995) (noting that a plaintiff has a remedy only if her identity has a 
commercial value but arguing that “celebrity status should not be an absolute 
prerequisite”); Ann Margaret Eames, Caught on Tape: Exposing the Unsettled 
and Unpredictable State of the Right of Publicity, 3 J. HIGH TECH. L. 41, 51 
(2004) (explaining that the right of publicity has evolved to a point that it now 
protects everyone, not just celebrities). But see Bahlert, supra note 24, at 154 
(“Some jurisdictions only grant the right of publicity to famous people, while 
others permit its use by every individual.”); Wyman, supra note 25, at 170 
(“Another issue exacerbated by the confusion among states and courts is exactly 
who may assert the right of publicity. Specifically, there is no consensus on 
whether the right of publicity is reserved for celebrities or whether all 
individuals have such a right.”). 
 49. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 834 
(6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the right of publicity protects “commercial 
exploitation” of one’s identity and thus individuals with an identity capable of 
exploiting have more use for it). In addition to being invoked primarily by 
celebrities, the right of publicity developed specifically to protect them. Id. at 
835. 
 50. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 111 (crediting the “fame phenomenon” for 
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celebrities and noncelebrities because it is broader and includes 
elements like the right to “seclusion or solitude” that celebrities 
and noncelebrities can equally enjoy.51 
The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition (the 
Restatement) accurately summarizes what the right of publicity 
generally protects.52 Section 46 provides that the right of 
publicity guards an individual’s right to profit from his own 
identity and thus prohibits people from exploiting another’s 
identity without consent.53 Intent to violate another’s right of 
publicity is not normally an element of liability,54 although some 
courts and scholars suggest that it should be.55 Consumer 
confusion, which is often about “whether the celebrity endorsed 
the product,”56 is also not necessary.57 Because the right of 
                                                                                                     
necessitating the right of publicity). 
 51. Carson, 698 F.2d at 834. Roberta Kwall distinguishes the right of 
publicity from the right of privacy by arguing that the former is “the means of 
achieving compensation for the loss of financial gain associated with a 
defendant’s unauthorized appropriation” whereas the latter concerns “hurt 
feelings.” KWALL, supra note 47, at 119; accord Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 
F.3d 725, 730 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The right to publicity protects pecuniary, not 
emotional, interests.”). 
 52. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 46–49 (1995) 
(describing what the right of publicity protects, how the right is violated, and 
what the appropriate damages are). 
 53. See id. § 46 (“One who appropriates the commercial value of a person’s 
identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of 
identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate 
under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49.”); see also Marc Edelman, Closing the 
“Free Speech” Loophole: The Case for Protecting College Athletes’ Publicity 
Rights in Commercial Video Games, 65 FLA. L. REV. 553, 560 (2013) (“In almost 
all states, a prima facie claim for violating one’s right of publicity requires the 
showing of four elements: (1) the use of one’s identity; (2) for purposes of a 
commercial advantage; (3) without consent; and (4) in a manner that causes 
monetary harm.”). 
 54. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) 
(explaining that, under Zacchini, “actual malice” does not apply to the right of 
publicity); § 46 cmt. e (providing that a plaintiff does not have the burden of 
proving intent). 
 55. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977) 
(noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had considered intent); Gutmann, supra 
note 25, at 234–35 (maintaining that the right of publicity test in the video 
game context must account for a manufacturer’s intent). 
 56. David M. Schlachter, Note and Comment, Adjudicating the Right of 
Publicity in Three Easy Steps, 14 J.L. & POL’Y 471, 479 (2006). 
 57. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. 
“GROOVE IS IN THE HART” 327 
publicity is a common law right that varies significantly among 
the states that adopt it, there are many other elements, like 
descendibility, that differ by state.58 Although differences among 
states remain,59 celebrities generally have more right of publicity 
protection in the United States than abroad.60 
C. Justifying the Right of Publicity 
As already noted, the broad rationale for the right of 
publicity is protecting celebrities’ rights to profit commercially 
from their own fame.61 As the Supreme Court explained in 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co.,62 “The 
rationale . . . is the straightforward one of preventing unjust 
enrichment by the theft of good will.”63 Fairness is thus the 
                                                                                                     
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1281 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The right of publicity protects the 
celebrity, not the consumer.”); Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 460 (6th 
Cir. 2003) (noting that a right of publicity claim differs from a false advertising 
claim because a right of publicity claim does not require evidence of consumer 
confusion); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b–c (1995) 
(noting that “[p]roof of deception or consumer confusion is not required for the 
imposition of liability”). 
 58. See § 46 cmt. h (1995) (explaining that some states have not considered 
whether the right of publicity is descendible while others have made the right 
descendible only under certain conditions). 
 59. See infra Part II.D (examining these differences). 
 60. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 34 (noting that despite the similarities 
between publicity rights and moral rights, the United States “is a leader among 
nations in protecting publicity rights” while offering little protection of moral 
rights). 
 61. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 
(6th Cir. 1983) (“The theory of the right is that a celebrity’s identity can be 
valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that 
may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that 
identity.”); Nimmer, supra note 43, at 216 (insisting that “every person is 
entitled to the fruit of his labors unless there are important countervailing 
public policy considerations”). 
 62. 433 U.S. 562 (1977). 
 63. Id. at 576. Justice White wrote that “the [s]tate’s interest in permitting 
a ‘right of publicity’ . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright 
law, focusing on the right of the individual to reap the reward of his endeavors 
and having little to do with protecting feelings or reputation.” Id. at 573; accord 
§ 46 cmt. c (explaining that the right of publicity is designed to prevent free-
riding off of celebrities’ hard-earned reputations, especially exploitation that 
would diminish celebrities’ reputations). 
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doctrine’s foundation.64 Although the right of publicity’s 
justification seems straightforward, Susannah Rooney suggests a 
more complex, multifaceted policy rationale.65 Rooney’s theory 
focuses on the right of publicity in general, but her reasoning is 
also applicable to the right of publicity’s necessity in the video 
game context.66 
First, Rooney proposes that the right of publicity protects 
moral rights similar to the way that copyright law operates 
abroad.67 This first theory does not deal with incentivizing 
creativity but instead recognizes an inherent right to control one’s 
reputation and identity.68 The theory is that moral rights are a 
broad category and that the right of publicity deals solely with 
these rights in the context of an individual’s likeness.69 Sean 
Whaley suggests that this moral rights concept relates back to 
John Locke’s theory of natural rights, which partially relies on 
the assumption that “every man has a right to own that which he 
has mixed his labor with.”70 In the video game context, this moral 
                                                                                                     
 64. See Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 462 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Ch. Div. 1967) (“It is unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize or 
exploit or capitalize upon another’s name, reputation or accomplishments 
merely because the owner’s accomplishments have been highly publicized.” 
(emphasis added)). 
 65. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 927 (observing that “[t]hree major schools 
of thought have evolved regarding the policy reasons behind the right of 
publicity”). 
 66. See id. at 941–44 (discussing Hart and Keller and arguing that they 
demonstrate the need for a federal right of publicity). 
 67. See id. at 927 (explaining the theory of moral rights and noting that 
American copyright law does not account for this theory). 
 68. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(defining the right of publicity as “the inherent right of every human being to 
control the commercial use of his or her identity”); Rooney, supra note 27, at 927 
(distinguishing this “inherent moral right” from a right arising from diligence 
and effort). 
 69. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 162 (suggesting that the right of publicity 
is only one of many ways in which laws protect moral rights).  
 70. Sean D. Whaley, “I’m a Highway Star”: An Outline for a Federal Right 
of Publicity, 31 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 257, 263 (2009); see also A. JOHN 
SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 68–78 (1992) (discussing the basis for 
Locke’s theory of natural rights and explaining how Locke viewed various 
rights). But see GILLIAN BLACK, PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND IMAGE: EXPLOITATION AND 
LEGAL CONTROL 97–99 (2011) (rejecting the theory that the right of publicity is 
needed as an “individual’s desert or reward” for labor because a celebrity’s fame 
is often the result of luck and good fortune rather than hard work). 
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rights theory means that a celebrity has the innate right to 
choose what games to appear in and not appear in.71 
Second, Rooney finds economics to be a major rationale for 
the right of publicity.72 Tragedy of the commons logic requires 
limiting the use of publicity to prevent dilution of the value of 
celebrities’ personas.73 The more obvious economic rationale is 
the need to incentivize advances in creativity, just as in copyright 
law.74 If celebrities’ images are exploitable at will, individuals will 
have less incentive to work toward fame and fortune.75 Because 
many celebrities are famous for making major contributions that 
better society, there is a policy interest in encouraging and 
preserving such initiative.76 The policy of incentivizing fame 
applies in the video game context, where there is also a strong 
need to incentivize video game companies’ creativity. 
Lastly, Rooney argues that the right of publicity is necessary 
to prevent consumer confusion.77 Similar to the rationale behind 
trademark law, “there must not be an unauthorized link to a 
brand or, in the case of publicity, a person.”78 As noted above, a 
                                                                                                     
 71. See infra notes 269–270 (explaining that the right of publicity is a 
moral right because a celebrity’s right to choose not to appear in a video game 
might be based on a moral objection). 
 72. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 927–28 (identifying and describing two 
economic theories that justify the right of publicity). 
 73. See id. at 928 (noting that overuse can dilute and even destroy publicity 
and thus recognizing the need to control the use of publicity). 
 74. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 94–95 (analogizing the right of publicity to 
copyright law based on the policy goal of encouraging creativity and 
advancement); Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (noting that this rationale “mirrors 
the justifications for copyright and patent” law). 
 75. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 126 (explaining the correlation between 
the protection of publicity rights and the incentive to invest in one’s persona); 
Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (arguing that the right of publicity incentivizes 
celebrities by design). But see Recent Case, In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litigation, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013), 127 HARV. L. 
REV. 1212, 1217 (2014) [hereinafter Recent Case] (“[T]here are already ample 
incentives to pursue fame. . . . Thus, the marginal incentive provided by the 
right of publicity is likely to be negligible.”). 
 76. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 928 (providing that identities need 
protection if they “can be viewed as valuable to society and as useful tools of 
business”).  
 77. See id. (explaining how the right of publicity helps to prevent consumer 
confusion). 
 78. Id. 
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right of publicity claim does not require proof of consumer 
confusion.79 This justification nevertheless applies in the video 
game context because consumers playing a video game may, and 
often do, rationally believe that a celebrity featured in that game 
endorsed the game and consented to her inclusion.80 
Several justifications for the right of publicity exist, all of 
which are relevant in the video game context. Part V.A argues 
that courts and legislatures must tailor the test for whether a 
video game infringes an individual’s right of publicity toward 
these justifications.81 
D. How Various States Apply the Right of Publicity 
While the above subpart spells out the justifications behind 
the right of publicity, many states do not recognize the right.82 
Nineteen states have statutorily adopted the right of publicity.83 
                                                                                                     
 79. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (explaining that courts and 
legislatures did not design the right of publicity to protect consumers). 
 80. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 61–62 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting the issue of consumers mistakenly believing that Kirby 
endorsed the video game); Brandon Johansson, Note, Pause the Game: Are Video 
Game Manufacturers Punting Away the Publicity Rights of Retired Athletes?, 10 
NEV. L.J. 784, 810 (2010) (arguing that sports video games present “a high 
likelihood of consumer confusion regarding the athlete’s endorsement of the 
game”). But see BLACK, supra note 70, at 100 (insisting that consumer confusion 
is not a legitimate justification for the right of publicity because “[m]embers of 
the public are no longer, if they ever were, likely to believe wholeheartedly that 
a celebrity uses or believes in the product she advertises”).  
 81. See infra Part V.A. (arguing that a workable test needs to be consistent 
to account for consumers’, celebrities’, and video game companies’ reasonable 
expectations). 
 82. See Brittany A. Adkins, Comment, Crying Out for Uniformity: 
Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of Publicity Protection Through a 
Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV. 499, 500–01 (2010) (observing 
that the right is not uniformly applied even within the states that recognize it). 
 83. Id. These nineteen states are California, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 540.08 (Westlaw 
through 2013 Sess.); Illinois, 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§ 1075/10 to /60 (Westlaw 
through 2013 Sess.); Indiana, IND. CODE §§ 32-36-1-1 to -20 (Westlaw through 
2013 First Regular Sess.); Kentucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 391.170 (West, 
Westlaw through 2013 First Regular Sess. and 2013 Extraordinary Sess.); 
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 3A (Westlaw through Chapter 25 of 
the 2014 Second Annual Sess.); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (Westlaw 
through 2013 Sess.); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 597.770–597.810 (Westlaw 
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Twelve others recognize the doctrine through common law, some 
by a name other than the “right of publicity,” but have not 
codified it.84  
In the states that recognize a right of publicity, the 
application and intricacies of the right differ dramatically.85 
                                                                                                     
through 2013 Sess.); New York, N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney, 
Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2741.01–2741.99 
(West, Westlaw through 2013 portion of 2013–2014 Sess.); Oklahoma, OKLA. 
STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1448, 1449 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Pennsylvania, 42 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 8316 (Westlaw through 2013 legislation); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. 
LAWS §§ 9-1-28 to -28.1 (Westlaw through Chapter 534 of 2013 Sess.); 
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1102 to -1107 (Westlaw through 2013 
First Regular Sess.); Texas, TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 26.001–26.015 (West, 
Westlaw through 2013 Third Sess.); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 45-3-1 to -6, 76-9-
407 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Second Special Sess.); Virginia, VA. CODE 
ANN. § 8.01-40 (Westlaw through 2013 Sess.); Washington, WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 63.60.010 to .060 (Westlaw through 2013 legislation) (but note that 
Experience Hendrix L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, LTD, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122 
(W.D. Wash. 2011), held part of this statute unconstitutional); and Wisconsin, 
WIS. STAT. § 995.50 (Westlaw through 2013 Act 116). Adkins, supra note 82, at 
500–01; Statutes, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, http://rightofpublicity.com/statutes (last 
visited Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 84. See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 
(6th Cir. 1983) (recognizing the right of publicity in Michigan); Pooley v. Nat’l 
Hole-in-One Ass’n, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1112 (D. Ariz. 2000) (recognizing the 
right of publicity); Jim Henson Prods., Inc. v. John T. Brady & Assocs., Inc., 867 
F. Supp. 175, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (recognizing the right of publicity in 
Connecticut); Minnifield v. Ashcroft, 903 So. 2d 818, 824 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004) 
(recognizing the right of publicity); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. 
Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) 
(same); Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 441 P.2d 141, 144 (Haw. 
1968) (same); Simpson v. Cent. Me. Motors, Inc., 669 A.2d 1324, 1326 (Me. 1996) 
(same); Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998) 
(same); Bear Foot, Inc. v. Chandler, 965 S.W.2d 386, 389 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(same); Palmer v. Schonhorn Enters., Inc., 232 A.2d 458, 460 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1967) (same); Gignilliat v. Gignilliat, Savitz, & Bettis, L.L.P., 684 
S.E.2d 756, 760 (S.C. 2009) (same); Crump v. Beckley Newspapers, Inc., 320 
S.E.2d 70, 85 (W. Va. 1983) (same). 
 85. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 45 (noting the differences between the 
right of publicity in Indiana and Washington); Adkins, supra note 82, at 505 
(explaining that common differences include “the origins of state protection and 
the doctrine under which protection extends,” the specifics of what is protected, 
“assignability and descendibility,” requirements that the celebrity used the right 
during his or her lifetime, and duration); Christina Smedley, Case Note & 
Comment, Commercial Speech and the Transformative Use Test: The Necessary 
Limits of a First Amendment Defense in Right of Publicity Cases, 24 DEPAUL J. 
ART TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 451, 456 (2014) (summarizing general differences 
among states’ right of publicity laws); Wyman, supra note 25, at 168–69 
(discussing the major differences between states’ laws and arguing that this 
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Because the right of publicity is specific to states, some 
scholarship advocates for a uniform right of publicity that 
standardizes the right’s protections.86 While this Note does not 
support that suggestion, it does endorse the readily identifiable 
standard as the best way to analyze right of publicity claims in 
the video game context.87 This Note argues that there are benefits 
to states using the same standard for video games, but the 
recommended test need not be used by all states to be effective in 
those that do adopt it.88 The different state laws remain 
important for discussing the video game context because the 
cases arise from various jurisdictions, including California,89 New 
Jersey,90 and Michigan,91 and apply those various states’ laws. 
III. Precedent: Seminal Right of Publicity Cases and Cases in the 
Video Game Context 
This Part focuses on the cases that are critical to 
understanding the problem at issue. Subpart A addresses the 
general right of publicity cases that establish the tests currently 
considered in the video game context and that form the basis for 
this Note’s suggested readily identifiable standard.92 Subpart B 
                                                                                                     
variation contributes to the problem of unpredictability in evaluating right of 
publicity claims). 
 86. See, e.g., Adkins, supra note 82, at 505–24 (providing a comprehensive 
comparison between New York’s, California’s, Tennessee’s, and Indiana’s right 
of publicity statutes and arguing that the differences in state protections 
necessitate a uniform right of publicity). 
 87. See infra Part V.B (advocating for the readily identifiable standard and 
explaining why this is a better alternative than existing tests). 
 88. See infra Part V.B (maintaining that consistent application of the same 
test would be beneficial for protecting video game manufacturers’ expectations). 
 89. See generally In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013) (arising out of California); No 
Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) 
(same); Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) 
(same). 
 90. See generally Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(arising out of New Jersey). 
 91. See generally Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (arising out of Michigan). 
 92. See infra Part V.B (explaining the readily identifiable standard and 
how it is derived from existing precedent). 
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addresses the primary cases from the video game sphere that 
consider and apply the tests explained in subpart A. 
A. Seminal Right of Publicity Cases 
1. Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co. 
Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broadcasting Co. is the only 
right of publicity case the Supreme Court has decided.93 In 
Zacchini, Hugo Zacchini, a human cannonball entertainer, sued a 
local television broadcasting station that had both videotaped 
Zacchini’s performance after he told the reporter not to do so and 
showed the tape on the news.94 The Supreme Court of Ohio 
recognized the right of publicity but found for the defendant.95 It 
reasoned that a news station violates the right of publicity only 
when the station’s intent is to “appropriate the benefit of the 
publicity for some non-privileged private use” or “to injure the 
individual.”96  
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, finding 
that the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require states 
to privilege the press against the right of publicity.97 The Court 
                                                                                                     
 93. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 372 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(observing that Zacchini “is the first and only right of publicity case decided by 
the Supreme Court”). The Supreme Court has, however, recently heard a video 
game case with First Amendment implications. In Brown v. Entertainment 
Merchants Association, the Court held that video games qualify for First 
Amendment protection. 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011). Justice Scalia wrote, 
Like the protected, books, plays, and movies that preceded them, 
video games communicate ideas—and even social messages—through 
many familiar literary devices (such as characters, dialogue, plot, and 
music) and through features distinctive to the medium (such as the 
player’s interaction with the virtual world). That suffices to confer 
First Amendment Protection. 
Id. 
 94. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 563–64 
(1977) (describing how Zacchini asked the reporter not to film the human 
cannonball show and that the reporter videotaped the full performance the next 
day). 
 95. See id. at 564–65 (describing the complicated procedural posture 
including the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and reversal by the Ohio 
Court of Appeals). 
 96. Id. at 565 (internal quotations omitted). 
 97. See id. at 578–79 (“We conclude that although the State of Ohio may as 
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distinguished this case from Time, Inc. v. Hill,98 which the 
Ohio Supreme Court relied on, by noting that Hill did not 
involve the right of publicity.99 The Court concluded that Hill 
“does not mandate a media privilege to televise a performer’s 
act without his consent.”100 Courts today view Zacchini as a 
mandate to balance individuals’ rights of publicity with the 
First Amendment, but the Supreme Court unfortunately failed 
to dictate what test courts should use for this balancing.101 
2. Rogers v. Grimaldi: The Rogers Test 
The Second Circuit’s Rogers v. Grimaldi102 is the next 
seminal case. Rogers is a landmark right of publicity decision 
from 1989 that involves a movie title rather than a video 
game’s contents.103 It remains important in the video game 
context because it established the Rogers test, one of the three 
tests courts have used and considered using in determining 
whether a video game violates a celebrity’s right of publicity.104 
                                                                                                     
a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of this case, the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.”). 
 98. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). In Hill, the Court considered whether the New 
York courts had unconstitutionally denied the publisher of Life Magazine First 
Amendment protections of speech and press. Id. at 376. The Court, dealing with 
New York’s right of privacy statute, reasoned that the freedom of the press was 
designed to benefit the public at large rather than the press itself. Id. at 389. It 
held that First Amendment protections precluded applying New York’s right of 
privacy statute in this case. Id. at 387–88. The Court concluded that the original 
jury conclusion awarding the plaintiff both compensatory and punitive damages 
was reasonable, and it remanded the case. Id. at 392, 398. 
 99. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572–74 (noting that this case and Hill 
involved different claims and that Hill did not implicate broadcasting an act 
that the performer was paid for). 
 100. Id. at 570. 
 101. See Kyle D. Simcox, Comment, Selling Your Soul at the Crossroads: The 
Need for a Harmonized Standard Limiting the Publicity Rights of Professional 
Athletes, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 87, 93 (2013) (noting Zacchini’s “lasting impact” 
and explaining that the lack of a clear test for balancing the right of publicity 
and the First Amendment is in part attributable to the Court’s failure to 
establish a test). 
 102. 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 103. See id. at 1004–05 (explaining that the case’s right of publicity issue 
involves a movie title’s relationship to the plaintiff’s name). 
 104. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 63 (noting that the Rogers test, along 
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Ginger Rogers, an actress who was most famous for her 
roles in movies dancing with Fred Astaire, sued the company 
and directors who produced a movie entitled Ginger and 
Fred.105 The film focused on two cabaret performers who 
became known as Ginger and Fred in Italy but had nothing to 
do with either Rogers’s or Astaire’s actual lives.106 Rogers sued 
under three theories, and the District Court for the Southern 
District of New York granted summary judgment for the 
defendants.107 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
ruling.108 
The Second Circuit applied Oregon law to the right of 
publicity claim but noted that there was no precedent in 
Oregon on the issue.109 The court then established and adopted 
the test that a movie title violates one’s right of publicity only 
if “the title [is] ‘wholly unrelated’ to the movie or [is] ‘simply a 
disguised commercial advertisement for the sale of goods or 
services.’”110 It found that the title Ginger and Fred was 
“clearly related to the content of the movie” and thus that no 
right of publicity violation occurred.111 Although the Rogers 
court’s language limits its holding to the movie title context,112 
courts have recently considered extending Rogers’s wholly 
unrelated standard, or simply a disguised commercial 
                                                                                                     
with the transformative use test and predominant use test, is one of three 
alternatives courts have tried). 
 105. See Rogers, 875 F.2d at 996–97 (describing Rogers’s career and fame 
and explaining how she commercially profited from her name). 
 106. See id. (describing the movie’s basic plot and its weak connection with 
the lives and careers of Rogers and Astaire). 
 107. See id. at 997 (listing Rogers’s Lanham Act, right of publicity, and right 
of privacy claims and describing the case’s early procedural posture). 
 108. See id. at 1005 (concluding that the district court properly rejected all 
three of Rogers’s claims). 
 109. See id. at 1002 (observing that “there are no reported decisions of any 
Oregon court on a right of publicity claim”). 
 110. Id. at 1004 (quoting Guglielmi v. Spelling–Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 
454, 457 n.6 (Cal. 1979) and Frosch v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 75 A.D.2d 768, 
769 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980)). 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. (identifying that the holding applies specifically to “the use of a 
celebrity’s name in a movie title”). 
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advertisement standard, to the video game context.113 The 
Restatement also adopts the Rogers test.114 
3. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. 
In 1992, the Ninth Circuit decided White v. Samsung 
Electronics America, Inc.115 Vanna White, the popular Wheel of 
Fortune personality, sued Samsung for violating her right of 
publicity by using her image in an advertisement.116 The 
advertisement featured a robot dressed like White posing next to 
a game show board similar to the Wheel of Fortune set.117 The 
court concluded that the robot’s features were “consciously 
selected to resemble White’s hair and dress” and that the 
advertisement’s background was “instantly recognizable as the 
Wheel of Fortune game show set.”118 
The Ninth Circuit held that the common law right of 
publicity is not limited to appropriation of one’s “name or 
likeness” as the district court below had concluded.119 It cited 
                                                                                                     
 113. See, e.g., Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(describing and analyzing the Rogers test but rejecting it because it is a “blunt 
instrument, unfit for widespread application in cases that require a carefully 
calibrated balancing”); Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 
765–66 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (citing and applying the Rogers test and concluding 
that the game was not “wholly unrelated” to the plaintiffs’ song); see also Recent 
Case, supra note 75, at 1218 (advocating that courts apply the Rogers test in the 
video game context because it is “appropriately deferential to core protected 
speech”). 
 114. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 461 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that the “‘[u]se of another’s identity in a novel, play, or motion 
picture is . . . not ordinarily an infringement [of the right of publicity, unless] 
the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not 
related to the identified person’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 47 cmt. c (1995))). 
 115. 971 F.2d 1395, 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
 116. See id. at 1396 (explaining that the Wheel of Fortune-themed 
advertisement was one in a series of Samsung advertisements depicting 
technology in the future and that White sued claiming that one of the ads was a 
robotic impersonation of her identity).  
 117. See id. (describing the robot and the game show set). 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. at 1397 (explaining that the district court had granted White 
summary judgment on her right of publicity claim because there was no 
appropriation of name or likeness and citing precedent that construed the right 
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both Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.120 and Carson 
v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.121 as precedent that the 
right of publicity does more than prohibit an exhaustive list of 
activities.122 The court explained that the right of publicity’s 
decisive factor is not “how the defendant has appropriated the 
plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so.”123 The 
court concluded that the ad “leave[s] little doubt about the 
celebrity the ad is meant to depict” and thus held that Samsung 
violated White’s right of publicity.124 
Judge Alarcon, dissenting on the right of publicity issue, 
vehemently advocated that the majority’s standard intruded too 
far into First Amendment protections.125 He contended that 
White’s prominence in the game show arena makes this case 
unique because any image of a game show hostess will inevitably 
remind a viewer of Vanna White.126 Judge Alarcon would thus 
have adopted a more stringent test and dismissed White’s claim 
because the advertisement showed a robot instead of a human 
like White.127 This Note’s suggested readily identifiable standard 
adopts Judge Alarcon’s view and advocates that a video game 
violates the right of publicity only when an image is immediately 
identifiable as definitively appropriating one’s image.128 
                                                                                                     
of publicity to be much broader). 
 120. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
 121. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
 122. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 
1992) (explaining that these cases “teach the impossibility of treating the right 
of publicity as guarding only against a laundry list of specific means of 
appropriating identity”). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 1399. 
 125. See id. at 1402 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (arguing that the record does 
not support the majority’s finding that Samsung violated White’s right of 
publicity). 
 126. See id. at 1405 (“I quite agree that anyone seeing the commercial 
advertisement would be reminded of Vanna White. Any performance by another 
female celebrity as a game-show hostess, however, will also remind the viewer of 
Vanna White because Vanna White’s celebrity is so closely associated with the 
role.”). 
 127. See id. at 1403 (“In this case, it is clear that a metal robot and not the 
plaintiff, Vanna White, is depicted in the commercial advertisement. The record 
does not show an appropriation of Vanna White’s identity.”). 
 128. See infra Part V.B (explaining the readily identifiable standard). 
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4. Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.: The 
Transformative Use Test 
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,129 the 
Supreme Court of California adopted the transformative use test, 
which is the primary test that courts have used to evaluate right 
of publicity claims relating to video games.130 Comedy III arose 
from the defendant’s production and sale of t-shirts that 
displayed an image that the defendant drew resembling The 
Three Stooges.131 The court first described the purposes behind 
both the California right of publicity statute discussed above and 
the First Amendment’s freedom of expression.132 It then 
concluded that balancing the two interests requires determining 
whether the expression sufficiently transforms the person’s 
likeness.133 The court explained that the Comedy III test, now 
                                                                                                     
 129. 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001). 
 130. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 160 (explaining that the transformative 
use test is “[c]urrently . . . the most popular test”); Blanke, supra note 24, at 63 
(identifying the transformative use test as one of the three major balancing tests 
that courts apply in video game right of publicity cases); Beth A. Cianfrone & 
Thomas A. Baker III, The Use of Student–Athlete Likenesses in Sport Video 
Games: An Application of the Right of Publicity, 20 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 35, 
52–53 (2010) (explaining the test’s origin in Comedy III and its importance in 
the video game context); supra Part III.B (illustrating the test’s popularity in 
video game cases). Although Comedy III first adopted the transformative use 
test in the right of publicity context, the test is likely based on a 1990 article by 
Pierre Leval on fair use in copyright. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221–22 
(discussing Leval’s definition of a transformative use and its similarity to 
Comedy III’s transformative use test). Leval articulated and explained the four 
factors listed in federal copyright law for determining whether a work is a fair 
use, including “the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the 
copyrighted work, the quantity and importance of the material used, and the 
effect of the use upon the potential market or value of the copyrighted work.” 
Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110 
(1990); see also 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing the same factors). 
 131. Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 800–01 (explaining the defendant’s business of 
“making charcoal drawings of celebrities” and noting that the business made 
$75,000 selling t-shirts that featured such a drawing of The Three Stooges). 
 132. See id. (explaining the statute’s purpose of preventing appropriation of 
individuals’ personas and the First Amendment’s dual purposes of permitting 
the free flow of ideas and respecting “individual development and self-
realization” (internal quotations omitted)); supra notes 85–89 and accompanying 
text (explaining California’s basic right of publicity statute). 
 133. See Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 808 (“This inquiry into whether a work is 
‘transformative’ appears to us to be necessarily at the heart of any judicial 
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known as the transformative use test, balances the two interests 
because a sufficiently transformed expression is both “especially 
worthy of First Amendment protection” and “less likely to 
interfere with the economic interest protected by the right of 
publicity.”134 
The Comedy III court extensively discussed how courts 
should apply the transformative use test.135 The court explained 
that considerations include (1) “whether the celebrity likeness is 
one of ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is 
synthesized . . . or whether [it] is the very sum and substance of 
the work in question”; (2) whether the work “is so transformed 
that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression”; 
(3) “whether the literal and imitative or the creative elements 
predominate the work”; (4) whether the work’s “marketability 
and economic value . . . derive primarily from the fame of the 
celebrity depicted”; and (5) whether the defendant’s goal is to 
“commercially exploit” the celebrity’s fame.136 After applying 
these five considerations, the court concluded that the t-shirt 
design was not sufficiently transformative and that the defendant 
thus violated Comedy III’s right of publicity.137 
5. Winter v. DC Comics 
The California Supreme Court retrenched the transformative 
use test nine years after Comedy III. In Winter v. DC Comics,138 
the Winters brothers, who were well-known musicians, alleged 
                                                                                                     
attempt to square the right of publicity with the First Amendment.”). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See id. at 809–10 (providing guidance on what courts using the 
transformative use test should consider when looking at an expressive work). 
 136. Id. Although the Comedy III court did not explicitly list these as 
considerations, the Ninth Circuit has interpreted them as “five factors” for 
courts to consider in the video game context. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1274 (9th Cir. 2013). But see 
id. at 1285 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Comedy III court 
consciously did not label these considerations as “analytical factors” because of 
the need to conduct a “holistic examination” under the transformative use test). 
 137. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 811 
(Cal. 2001) (applying the five considerations and finding that protecting the 
defendant’s work would effectively nullify the right of publicity). 
 138. 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003). 
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that DC Comics violated the brothers’ rights of publicity by 
appropriating their likenesses in a comic book series.139 The 
comics featured two characters that physically resembled the 
brothers and shared their first names.140 The court distinguished 
Comedy III based on the comic books’ inherent transformative 
nature.141 It held that the defendants’ comics sufficiently 
transformed the Winter brothers’ likenesses and that the First 
Amendment thus protected the comics.142  
6. Doe v. TCI Cablevision: The Predominant Use Test 
In Doe v. TCI Cablevision,143 the Supreme Court of Missouri 
adopted and applied the predominant use test.144 This test, 
developed in 2003 after the Rogers and transformative use tests, 
is the third and final standard currently relevant in right of 
publicity cases in the video game context.145 Anthony “Tony” 
                                                                                                     
 139. See id. at 476 (explaining the Winters brothers’ careers and the comic 
book series’s storyline). 
 140. See id. (discussing the similarities between the Winters brothers and 
the comic book characters and emphasizing that the Winters brothers were from 
Texas and that the comic books featured a cowboy theme). 
 141. See id. at 479–80 (“The artist in Comedy III . . . essentially 
sold . . . pictures of The Three Stooges, not transformed expressive works by the 
artist. Here, by contrast, defendants essentially sold . . . [c]omics depicting 
fanciful, creative characters, not pictures of the Winter brothers. This makes all 
the difference.”). The Winters court’s distinction indicates that it would have 
accepted Judge Alarcon’s argument and decided White differently because the 
robot in White was a “fanciful, creative character[ ]” rather than a picture of 
White. See id. (distinguishing the creativity in Winter from the picture of The 
Three Stooges at issue in Comedy III). 
 142. See id. at 480 (summarizing the court’s transformative use test 
analysis).  
 143. 110 S.W.3d 363 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 144. See id. at 374 (quoting and citing Mark Lee’s formulation of this test 
and using the test to conclude that the right of publicity outweighed the First 
Amendment in this case). 
 145. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 63 (including the predominant use test as 
one of the three major balancing tests used by courts in video game right of 
publicity cases); Cianfrone & Baker, supra note 130, at 52 (same); Gutmann, 
supra note 25, at 219 (same). Although considered in many subsequent cases, no 
court has applied the predominant use test since TCI Cablevision. Gutmann, 
supra note 25, at 220. Jon Garon suggests that the case’s “factually specific 
nature” explains its inconsistency with other opinions. Jon M. Garon, Playing in 
the Virtual Arena: Avatars, Publicity, and Identity Reconceptualized Through 
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Twist, a former National Hockey League (NHL) player, sued the 
defendants after discovering that they had produced and sold a 
comic book titled Spawn that featured an evil character named 
Tony Twist.146 Twist was an “enforcer” whose primary role was to 
fight opposing players and thereby protect his teammates.147 The 
defendants admitted that they intentionally named the character 
after the real Twist.148 
After relabeling Twist’s case as a right of publicity claim,149 
the TCI Cablevision court explained the existing approaches, 
including the Restatement’s relatedness test and the 
transformative use test.150 The court rejected both alternatives, 
reasoning that the tests accounted solely for expression and 
thereby precluded a defendant’s commercial purposes.151 Instead, 
the court adopted what it termed the predominant use test and 
quoted Mark Lee’s original articulation of this test.152 Under the 
                                                                                                     
Virtual Worlds and Computer Games, 11 CHAP. L. REV. 465, 505 (2008). He 
argues that TCI Cablevision is “far less persuasive” than other opinions because 
the comic book uses Twist’s name as a marketing ploy, unrelated to the comic 
itself. Id. at 504. 
 146. See TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d at 365–66 (describing the background 
of Twist’s career, the teams he played for, how his career ended after a 
motorcycle accident, and explaining the Tony Twist character’s role in the 
Spawn comic). 
 147. See id. at 366 (explaining the role of an enforcer and Twist’s notorious 
reputation for inflicting pain on his opponents). 
 148. See id. (noting that McFarlane, one of the founders of the company that 
marketed and produced Spawn, admitted numerous times that the company 
based the Tony Twist character on the real Twist and that the company would 
continue to use hockey players’ names in comic books). 
 149. See id. at 368 (explaining that Twist filed a misappropriation action but 
that a case like this that involves a celebrity seeking to recover money derived 
by others from using his name is “more precisely labeled a right of publicity 
action”). 
 150. See id. at 373 (explaining these tests and their origins). 
 151. See id. at 374 (“The weakness of [the two tests] is that they give too 
little consideration to the fact that many uses of a person’s name and identity 
have both expressive and commercial components.”). The court elaborated: 
“These tests operate to preclude a cause of action whenever the use of the name 
and identity is in any way expressive, regardless of its commercial 
exploitation. . . . Though these tests purport to balance the prospective interests 
involved, there is no balancing at all—once the use is determined to be 
expressive, it is protected.” Id. 
 152. See id. (asserting that the predominant use test “better addresses the 
cases where speech is both expressive and commercial”); see also Mark S. Lee, 
Agents of Chaos: Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of Publicity–Free 
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predominant use test, a product that “predominantly exploits the 
commercial value of an individual’s identity” violates the right of 
publicity whereas the First Amendment protects a product with 
the “predominant purpose” of “mak[ing] an expressive comment 
on or about a celebrity.”153 The court concluded that the comic 
book’s predominant purpose was exploiting Twist’s identity and 
thus held that the defendants violated Twist’s right of 
publicity.154 
B. Video Game Right of Publicity Cases 
1. Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc. 
Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc.155 is the first major video game 
right of publicity case. The plaintiff, Kierin Kirby, was a singer, 
dancer, and member of the musical group Deee-Lite, best known 
for its hit “Groove is in the Heart.”156 Kirby sued Sega over its 
production of the video game Space Channel 5, a futuristic 
Japanese game involving aliens that invade Earth.157 After Sega’s 
Japanese subsidiary contacted her about promoting a North 
American version of the game, Kirby claimed that Space Channel 
5’s main character, Ulala, looked and danced like Kirby.158 
Nahoko Nezu, the dancer and choreographer who created Ulala’s 
dance moves, maintained that the dance moves were her own and 
                                                                                                     
Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 500 (2003) (arguing that 
whether a creative work violates a celebrity’s right of publicity depends on 
“[w]hat is being exploited”). 
 153. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(internal quotations omitted). 
 154. See id. (finding that “Twist’s name has become predominantly a ploy to 
sell comic books and related products rather than an artistic or literary 
expression”). 
 155. 144 Cal. App. 4th 47 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 156. Id. at 50. 
 157. See id. at 51 (describing the game’s premise). 
 158. See id. at 52 (explaining that Kirby’s lawsuit followed the offer to use 
Kirby and possibly “Groove is in the Heart” to promote a new version of the 
game). 
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that she had never heard of Kirby.159 Kirby alleged six causes of 
action, including a right of publicity violation.160  
The Kirby court noted that it was obliged to follow the 
California Supreme Court’s transformative use test.161 The court 
described how Comedy III formulated the test and explained both 
the factors that Comedy III and Winter developed and how these 
factors led to the two cases’ respective outcomes.162 The court 
concluded that “Ulala [was] more than a mere likeness or literal 
depiction of Kirby” and that Kirby’s right of publicity claim thus 
failed under the transformative use test.163 It determined that 
Sega added significant new expression to Kirby’s image and 
rejected Kirby’s contention that the new expression must “say 
something” about Kirby to receive First Amendment protection.164 
The court focused on the many physical differences between 
Ulala and Kirby165 and distinguished this case from Comedy III 
because of the absence of a “literal depiction.”166 
2. Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc. 
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan 
decided Romantics v. Activision Publishing, Inc.167 in 2008 using 
                                                                                                     
 159. Id. at 51. 
 160. See id. at 53 (explaining that Kirby’s complaint included 
misappropriation, Lanham Act, unfair competition, and other claims in addition 
to the right of publicity claim). 
 161. See id. at 58–59, 61 (noting that the California Supreme Court had 
adopted and applied this test in Comedy III and Winter and explaining that the 
court was “bound to follow the decisions of [the California] Supreme Court, not 
those of another state”). 
 162. See id. at 58–60 (clarifying that the Comedy III court designed the test 
to balance a famous person’s right to control her identity with First Amendment 
protections and noting that Winter clarified that the test’s “pivotal issue is 
whether the work is transformative, not the form of literary expression”). 
 163. Id. at 59. 
 164. See id. at 60 (explaining that the differences between Kirby and Sega’s 
new expression “are not trivial” and declining to add to the transformative use 
test’s requirements). 
 165. See id. at 59 (noting that Ulala and Kirby “share similarities” but 
focusing on differences in height, body build, hairstyle, fashion, and dancing 
style). 
 166. Id. at 61. 
 167. 574 F. Supp. 2d 758 (E.D. Mich. 2008). 
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the Rogers test.168 The current members of the rock band The 
Romantics claimed that the publisher and distributor of the video 
game Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s violated the members’ 
right of publicity.169 The game included The Romantics’ song 
“What I Like About You.”170 The plaintiffs alleged that the song 
in the game sounded so similar to the band’s original version that 
the game would mislead consumers to believe that the plaintiffs 
had “sponsored or endorsed” the video game.171 The nature of the 
claim distinguishes this case from most other right of publicity 
cases involving video games that traditionally deal with the 
celebrities’ images rather than their sound.172 
The court first observed that Michigan’s right of publicity did 
not apply to the sound of a voice or a combination of voices.173 It 
then explained that the First Amendment would protect the 
defendants’ expression even if the plaintiffs had a right of 
publicity over their voices.174 The court cited the Rogers test for 
determining when the First Amendment shields “expressive 
works” from right of publicity claims.175 The Sixth Circuit had 
adopted the Rogers test in Parks v. LaFace Records,176 but its 
respective district courts had not applied it in the video game 
                                                                                                     
 168. See id. at 765 (citing the Rogers test as the means of determining 
whether the First Amendment outweighs one’s right of publicity). 
 169. See id. at 762 (explaining the relationship between the parties and the 
plaintiffs’ claims). 
 170. See id. (describing the song’s popularity). 
 171. Id. at 762–63. 
 172. See, e.g., In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing 
Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (noting that the athletes’ 
images are at issue); No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 
1022 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that the issue is whether the game 
transforms the band members’ images). 
 173. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 764 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008) (explaining that a right of publicity exists in Michigan but declining 
to extend the doctrine to a voice or voices “even if distinctive”). 
 174. See id. at 765 (agreeing with the defendants that even a “cognizable 
claim” would be “preempted by the First Amendment”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 447–50 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(adopting the Rogers test after noting the other circuits that had adopted it and 
after rejecting the “likelihood of confusion factors” and “alternative avenues 
test”). 
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context until Romantics.177 The Romantics court determined that 
the game’s original content and a user’s choices in playing the 
game rendered the game an expressive work and thus 
necessitated applying the Rogers test.178 The court concluded that 
the Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s survived the Rogers test 
because the song was not wholly unrelated to the game’s content 
and because the song was not a disguised commercial 
advertisement for the game.179  
3. No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc. 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc.180 is the most recent 
right of publicity case involving a music group and a video game. 
The famous rock band No Doubt181 sued Activision over 
depictions of No Doubt in the video game Band Hero, a part of 
Activision’s Guitar Hero series.182 No Doubt had licensed its 
members’ likenesses to Activision for use in the game but argued 
that Activision used the members’ likenesses in ways that 
                                                                                                     
 177. See id. at 450 (“Although the Rogers test has been criticized, we find it 
the most appropriate method to balance the public interest in avoiding 
consumer confusion with the public interest in free expression.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 178. See Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 766 (explaining that the game was 
an expressive work because it “allows players to customize their game play 
experience, contains large amounts of original artwork, and requires complex 
synchronization so that the audio and visual elements of the [g]ame line up with 
a player’s manipulation of the controller”). 
 179. See id. (applying the Rogers test and clarifying why the video game 
passed the test). The court concluded, “Given that the purpose of the [g]ame is to 
allow players to pretend they are in a rock band, the [s]ong is not wholly 
unrelated to the content of the work. . . . [N]either the song nor [the p]laintiffs 
are referenced in the [g]ame’s advertising, and it is possible to play the [g]ame 
and never encounter the [s]ong. Thus, the [s]ong cannot be ‘a disguised 
commercial advertisement.’” Id. 
 180. 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
 181. See id. at 1023 (calling No Doubt “internationally-recognized” and 
noting that Gwen Stefani is the band’s lead singer). 
 182. See id. at 1022–23 (explaining No Doubt’s allegations and Activision’s 
response); see also Marta Baffy, Note, Right of Publicity Licensing in a New Age: 
No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, Inc., 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 359, 362–
63 (2010) (describing Band Hero’s features and how the game fits into the 
Guitar Hero series). 
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violated the agreement.183 Band Hero featured avatars184 that 
intentionally resembled the band members, but the game allowed 
the members to sing other bands’ songs, to sing in the voices of 
the opposite sex, and to perform without the full band.185 No 
Doubt claimed that the agreement permitted Activision to use the 
members’ likenesses “only in conjunction with the selected No 
Doubt songs” and that it did not permit Activision to alter the 
members’ avatars.186 No Doubt brought six claims, including a 
right of publicity action.187 
The trial court found for No Doubt, applying the 
transformative use test and concluding that Activision did not 
sufficiently transform the band members’ avatars.188 The 
California Court of Appeal first explained the transformative use 
test as articulated by Comedy III and as applied in Winter and 
Kirby.189 It emphasized that the avatars clearly resembled the 
band members.190 The court explained that surrounding the 
                                                                                                     
 183. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1023–24 (quoting the agreement’s 
language and explaining No Doubt’s claims relating to features in the game that 
No Doubt was not informed about). 
 184. See Jason Ross, Note, Licensing and Access Problems Producers of 
Video Games Face in Foreign Markets: A Case Study, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. 
L. REV. 429, 429 n.2 (2012) (“An avatar is a computerized puppet controlled by 
the human player that interacts within the virtual game world.”). This Note 
uses “avatar” and “character” interchangeably. 
 185. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1024 (explaining No Doubt’s qualms 
with these features of the game that the band claimed represented “additional 
exploitation of their likeness”). 
 186. Id.; see also Baffy, supra note 182, at 365–68 (citing No Doubt’s 
complaint and elaborating on the band’s basis for its allegations). 
 187. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1025 (summarizing No Doubt’s 
claims including fraudulent inducement, breach of contract, and injunctive relief 
among others). 
 188. See id. (explaining the lower court’s application of the transformative 
use test and noting the lower court’s finding that Activision may have also 
contracted away certain First Amendment rights). 
 189. See id. at 1030–33 (describing the test and how the courts applied it in 
these cases). 
 190. See id. at 1033 (noting that Activision admitted that the avatars were 
“painstakingly designed to mimic [the No Doubt members’] likenesses”). The 
court also focused on the lack of a feature that would allow users to alter the 
characters: “The game does not permit players to alter the No Doubt avatars in 
any respect; they remain at all times immutable images of the real celebrity 
musicians, in stark contrast to the ‘fanciful, creative characters’ in Winter and 
Kirby.” Id. 
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avatars with creative elements is not sufficient to pass the 
transformative use test; instead, the game must transform the 
celebrity’s image.191 It distinguished this case from Kirby by 
explaining that Kirby involved a completely new character 
performing acts distinct from the plaintiff’s acts, whereas the 
avatars in Band Hero performed music just as the real No Doubt 
members did.192 The court thus concluded that Activision violated 
No Doubt’s right of publicity and affirmed the trial court’s 
judgment.193 
4. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc. and In re NCAA Student–Athlete 
Name & Likeness Licensing Litigation (Keller) 
Hart and Keller are the two most recent right of publicity 
decisions in the video game context.194 The cases’ facts are nearly 
                                                                                                     
 191. See id. at 1034 (explaining that the transformative use test requires 
that an added element alter the celebrity’s likeness).  
 192. See id. (“In Kirby, the pop singer was portrayed by an entirely new 
character—the space-age news reporter Ulala. In [this case], by contrast, . . . the 
avatars perform rock songs, the same activity by which the band achieved and 
maintains its fame.”); Blanke, supra note 24, at 52–53 (discussing the 
differences between Kirby and No Doubt and concluding that the No Doubt court 
found these differences to be “dispositive”). 
 193. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1034 (finding that Activision did not 
add any new elements to the band members’ images and thus holding that 
Activision’s First Amendment defense failed). Although the No Doubt court 
writes as if this was a clear case, commentary prior to the decision viewed it as 
much closer. See Baffy, supra note 182, at 382–83 (noting that No Doubt’s 
outcome was “not clear” and explaining how Activision could have avoided the 
suit by revealing the game’s features to the band). 
 194. Although they are the most recent decisions, former athletes are still 
litigating the right of publicity as it relates to sports-themed video games. See 
generally O’Bannon v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 09-CV-3329-CW (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 8, 2014). The O’Bannon plaintiffs, twenty current and former Division 
I football players and athletes, originally brought a right of publicity claim 
against Electronic Arts in addition to their antitrust and right of publicity 
claims against the NCAA. See id. at *6 (explaining that the plaintiffs originally 
sued both Electronic Arts and Collegiate Licensing Company). The plaintiffs 
reached a settlement with Electronic Arts before the Northern District of 
California decided O’Bannon. See id. (acknowledging the settlement). But 
O’Bannon remains important for studying the right of publicity. The court 
rejected the NCAA’s argument “that the First Amendment and certain state 
laws preclude student-athletes from asserting any rights of publicity.” Id. at 
*68. Finally, the court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in Keller, rejected the 
NCAA’s argument that the First Amendment exempts video game companies 
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identical.195 Electronic Arts produced the NCAA Football video 
game series.196 The games allow users to play with Division I 
football teams composed of avatars that are accurate visual 
representations of the team’s players in real life.197 The avatars’ 
talent levels also mimic those of the real college athletes.198 The 
avatars are only one dimension of how each game mimics a real 
college football environment,199 a feature that has facilitated the 
series’s success.200 
                                                                                                     
from having to acquire licenses to use “student-athletes’ names, images, and 
likenesses.” Id. at *75 n.13. For a fuller analysis of O’Bannon and its 
significance in both the right of publicity and antitrust contexts, see Marc 
Edelman, The District Court Decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate 
Athletic Association: A Small Step Forward for College-Athlete Rights, and a 
Gateway for Far Grander Change, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2319 (2014).  
 195. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 163 (“[T]he only significant factual 
difference between the two [cases] was the identity of the plaintiff.”). 
 196. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2013); In re NCAA 
Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 
(9th Cir. 2013). Electronic Arts first produced the annual game in 1993, but the 
company did not title the game NCAA Football until its 1997 version. Hart, 717 
F.3d at 146. Electronic Arts chose not to release the game’s 2014 version 
because of the litigation surrounding previous versions. Tom Risen, Electronic 
Arts Cancels NCAA 2014 Video Game After Lawsuit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. 
(Sept. 27, 2013, 5:26 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/ 
09/27/electronic-arts-cancels-ncaa-2014-video-game-after-lawsuit (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2015) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 197. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting the similarities between Hart’s avatar 
and the athlete in real life, including number, height, weight, home state and 
town, college team, and class year); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1272 (describing the 
similarities between Keller and his avatar, including number, “height, weight, 
skin tone, hair color, hair style, handedness, home state, play style (pocket 
passer), visor preference, facial features, and school year”); Bahlert, supra note 
24, at 150 (summarizing the similarities that Electronic Arts intentionally 
replicates); Edelman, supra note 53, at 554–55 (“[I]n NCAA Football 12, the 
avatar that represents University of Florida running back Chris Rainey 
possesses Chris Rainey’s actual height, weight, skin complexion, and hair style. 
In addition, both Chris Rainey and his virtual counterpart wear the same jersey 
number, visor, gloves, and sweatbands.”). 
 198. See Edelman, supra note 53, at 568 (“Moreover, Electronic Arts does 
not stop at simply copying the visual likeness of college athletes. NCAA Football 
avatars also have specific ratings based on athleticism and tendencies of the 
actual players they represent.”). 
 199. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (noting NCAA Football’s “focus on realism 
and detail—from realistic sounds, to game mechanisms, to team mascots”); 
Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271 (describing the game’s accurate representations of 
stadiums, coaches, cheerleaders, fans, and noises). 
 200. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (explaining that the game’s success is due in 
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The NCAA Football games have various game play modes, 
differing with each year’s specific game.201 Examples include 
“Dynasty Mode,” in which the user acts as a college team’s head 
coach for up to thirty years, and “Campus Legend Mode,” in 
which the user controls a single player for that player’s college 
career.202 Unlike the game in No Doubt, which did not allow users 
to alter the celebrities’ avatars,203 users of NCAA Football games 
“can change the digital avatar’s appearance and most of the vital 
statistics.”204 
Hart brought a right of publicity action regarding the 2004, 
2005, and 2006 NCAA Football games.205 The district court 
granted summary judgment for Electronic Arts, and Hart 
appealed.206 The Third Circuit began by noting that video games 
qualify as speech under the First Amendment207 and explaining 
that the court thus had to balance Hart’s right of publicity 
against Electronic Arts’ First Amendment rights.208 The court 
considered the predominant use test, the Rogers test, and the 
transformative use test.209 After discussing TCI Cablevision, the 
court rejected the predominant use test because of its subjective 
nature.210 The court then declined to apply the Rogers test 
                                                                                                     
large part to its reproduction of real life); Cianfrone & Baker, supra note 130, at 
47 (noting that “EA prides itself on producing the most realistic college football 
and basketball games on the market”). 
 201. See id. (describing the game’s typical single game format and the newer 
more advanced “multi-game” modes). 
 202. See id. (describing the game modes in more detail); Keller, 724 F.3d at 
1271–72 (same). 
 203. See supra note 190 (noting the lack of a transformative element in 
Band Hero). 
 204. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 205. Id. at 147. 
 206. See id. (explaining the case’s procedural posture and the district court’s 
reasoning for granting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment). 
 207. See supra note 93 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s recent Brown 
decision expressly conferred First Amendment rights on video games). 
 208. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 148–49 (citing Brown and explaining the 
balancing process). 
 209. See id. at 153 (explaining that these three tests “are of particular note” 
among the balancing tests adopted since Zacchini). 
 210. See id. at 153–54 (explaining the test’s origin, its application in TCI 
Cablevision, and the court’s reasons for rejecting it); infra note 306 and 
accompanying text (highlighting just how little the Hart court thought of the 
predominant use test). 
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because it would effectively allow any video game company to use 
a celebrity’s image in a game related to that celebrity’s area of 
fame.211 
The Hart court settled on the transformative use test based 
on its “flexible—yet uniformly applicable—analytical 
framework.”212 It described the test’s formation in Comedy III and 
its application in Winter, Kirby, and No Doubt.213 In applying the 
transformative use test, the Third Circuit first noted the 
remarkable resemblance between Hart and his avatar in NCAA 
Football.214 Although the court noted that the avatar was thus 
“not transformative,” it explained that the game’s feature 
allowing a user to alter players demanded further 
consideration.215  
The court clarified that the ability to alter avatars is not by 
itself enough for a game to pass the transformative use test.216 If 
it were, the court explained, producers like Electronic Arts could 
completely appropriate a celebrity’s likeness and avoid liability 
                                                                                                     
 211. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157–58 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that, under the Rogers test, Hart’s claim would fail simply because 
he is a football player, and his likeness would accordingly not be “wholly 
unrelated” to a football video game). The court also compared the right of 
publicity to trademark law, noting that a “broader, more nuanced test” is needed 
for video game right of publicity cases. Id. at 158. 
 212. Id. at 163. The court noted that it favored the transformative use test 
over the Rogers test because the former “maintains a singular focus on whether 
the work sufficiently transforms the celebrity’s likeness or identity.” Id. It 
preferred the transformative use test over the predominant use test because the 
latter does not sufficiently consider “whether [a video game] was merely created 
to exploit a celebrity’s likeness.” Id. Finally, the court explained that “the 
[t]ransformative [u]se [t]est is most consistent with other courts’ ad hoc 
approaches to right of publicity cases.” Id. at 164. 
 213. See id. at 158–63 (explaining how the courts articulated and applied 
the test in each of these cases). 
 214. See id. at 166 (noting similarities in physical appearance, clothing 
accessories, biographical information, and activity (i.e., playing football)). 
 215. See id. at 166–67 (explaining that the “ability to alter the avatar’s 
appearance” prohibited the court from quickly ruling for Hart based on the lack 
of a transformative element). The court distinguished this case from No Doubt 
by explaining that there is even less “transformative content” in NCAA Football 
than in Band Hero and by noting that Band Hero lacks an option to alter 
avatars. Id. at 166. 
 216. See id. at 167 (noting that changeability is not “sufficient to surmount 
the already-existing First Amendment protections”). 
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simply by adding such a feature.217 The court emphasized that 
Hart’s avatar was the “default position” and that any 
transformation was “predicated on the users’ desire to alter the 
avatar’s appearance.”218 It further reasoned that minor 
alterations to the player’s information and accessories were 
insufficient transformations219 and that more major alterations, 
like those of the player’s physical body, were not transformations 
of Hart’s likeness at all, but rather the user’s creation of a new 
player.220 The Third Circuit thus reversed the district court’s 
judgment and held that the NCAA Football games did not 
transform Hart’s likeness and that Electronic Arts violated Hart’s 
right of publicity.221 
Unlike Hart, Keller was a class action lawsuit against 
Electronic Arts.222 The district court in Keller concluded that 
Electronic Arts lacked a First Amendment defense and 
accordingly held for the former college athletes.223 Electronic Arts 
appealed, asserting both the transformative use test and the 
Rogers test as affirmative defenses.224 The Ninth Circuit first 
discussed the transformative use test as formulated in Comedy 
                                                                                                     
 217. See id. (summarizing the policy considerations against allowing video 
game companies this easy way around the right of publicity). 
 218. Id. at 168. 
 219. See id. (“The ability to make minor alterations—which substantially 
maintain the avatar’s resemblance to [Hart] . . . is likewise insufficient, for ‘[a]n 
artist depicting a celebrity must contribute something more than a merely 
trivial variation.’” (quoting Winter v. D.C. Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 478–79 (Cal. 
2003))). But see Garon, supra note 145, at 504 (arguing that the precedent prior 
to Hart indicated that a user’s ability to “manipulate the names and likeness to 
create new characters, cast those characters into a variety of sports, enhance the 
play of the characters, and evolve the people in a wide variety of ways” was 
sufficiently transformative). 
 220. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 168–69 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that Hart’s likeness would no longer exist after these larger 
changes). 
 221. See id. at 170 (summarizing the transformative use test analysis). 
 222. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. 
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 223. See id. at 1271 (discussing the case’s procedural history); Blanke, supra 
note 24, at 53 (explaining that the contradictory district court judgments in 
Hart and Keller are a major difference between the cases); Bucher, supra note 
26, at 19 (same). 
 224. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1273 (explaining that the issue on appeal was 
whether one of Electronic Arts’ affirmative defenses applied). 
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III and as applied in Winter, Kirby, and No Doubt.225 The court 
accepted this as the correct test based on the court’s obligation to 
follow state law and the existing California precedent for the 
transformative use test in the video game context.226 It noted that 
No Doubt “provide[d] persuasive guidance” and analogized NCAA 
Football’s features to those of Band Hero.227 The court 
emphasized that both this case and No Doubt lack transformed or 
completely new characters like those in Kirby.228 The Keller court 
also cited Hart as persuasive precedent in its transformative use 
analysis.229 
The Ninth Circuit rejected Electronic Arts’ Rogers test 
defense.230 It reasoned that the Rogers test protects consumers 
whereas the right of publicity protects celebrities.231 Because the 
plaintiffs’ claims related to celebrities, the Rogers test could not 
achieve the necessary balancing.232 It also explained that the 
Rogers test is not well accepted in the right of publicity arena.233 
The court thus affirmed the district court’s judgment.234 
The dissenting opinions in both Hart and Keller agree with 
their respective majorities that the transformative use test is the 
proper balancing approach but insist that the majority opinions 
applied this test incorrectly.235 Both dissents contend that the 
                                                                                                     
 225. See id. at 1273–75 (describing the test’s factors and its application in 
video game and non-video game California cases). 
 226. See id. at 1278 (noting that the court was bound to rule as it believed 
the California Supreme Court would). 
 227. See id. at 1277–78 (discussing the similarities between this case and No 
Doubt, including realistic settings, avatars doing what their respective 
celebrities do in real life, and avatars that look like the celebrities). 
 228. See id. at 1277 (distinguishing the “realistically portrayed” celebrities 
in this case and No Doubt from the fantastical character Ulala in Kirby). 
 229. See id. at 1278 (noting that the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion aligned with 
that of the Third Circuit in Hart). 
 230. See id. at 1280 (explaining that the court’s rejection of the Rogers test is 
consistent with Hart). 
 231. Id. at 1280–81. 
 232. See id. at 1281 (describing the plaintiffs’ arguments and concluding 
that the Rogers test “is simply not responsive to Keller’s asserted interests”). 
 233. See id. at 1281–82 (explaining that the only circuit to use the Rogers 
test in a right of publicity case was the Sixth Circuit in Parks but that the Sixth 
Circuit later declined to apply the test in another right of publicity decision). 
 234. Id. at 1284. 
 235. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 171 (3d Cir. 2013) (Ambro, J., 
“GROOVE IS IN THE HART” 353 
proper inquiry is whether the video game as a whole—not an 
individual avatar—is transformative.236 The opinions identify the 
many creative and transformative elements elsewhere in the 
NCAA Football games.237 The dissenting judges also distinguish 
these cases from prior right of publicity cases in the video game 
context by noting the NCAA Football games’ high number of 
avatars,238 use of “publicly available data,”239 and ability for users 
to alter avatars.240 
IV. Scholars’ Suggested Alternatives to Current Tests 
Scholars recognize that multiple, inconsistently applied tests 
create major problems.241 They have suggested numerous 
alternatives for remedying issues with the right of publicity as a 
whole.242 Two scholars have proposed new tests specifically for 
the video game context, although no court deciding a major case 
has seriously considered either of them.243  
                                                                                                     
dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority opinion’s “interpretation and 
application” of the transformative use test); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name 
& Likeness Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the transformative use test’s balancing 
favors Electronic Arts’ First Amendment freedoms). 
 236. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 171 (“I believe it is necessary to review the 
likeness in the context of the work in its entirety, rather than focusing on the 
individual’s likeness.”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1285 (asserting the need to evaluate 
the game as a whole). 
 237. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (describing the game series’s creative 
elements including “original graphics, videos, sound effects, and game 
scenarios”); Keller, 724 F.3d at 1271–72 (identifying creative elements such as 
the ability to create new players and the multiple game modes). 
 238. See Keller, 724 F.3d at 1287 (contrasting the high number of football 
players in the NCAA Football games to the relatively low number of band 
members in No Doubt’s Band Hero). 
 239. Id. at 1288. 
 240. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 175 (arguing that the ability to alter avatars 
“furthers the game’s transformative interactivity”). 
 241. See supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (explaining that scholars 
are aware of the need for uniform application of a single test). 
 242. See, e.g., Adkins, supra note 82, at 502 (advocating for a “Uniform Right 
of Publicity Act”); Smedley, supra note 85, at 471–72 (proposing a new spin on 
the transformative use test to remedy inconsistencies in right of publicity cases 
generally). 
 243. See supra Part III.B (explaining the tests that courts have used and 
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Brittany Adkins suggests a uniform right of publicity act that 
would govern the right of publicity as a whole.244 Adkins 
articulates four benefits of a uniform act that would apply in the 
right of publicity arena: (1) enabling businesses to operate 
interstate, (2) simplifying the law for individuals who frequently 
travel between states, (3) cutting the costs of doing business 
through “simplif[ied] transactions,” and (4) reducing forum 
shopping.245 Adkins’s uniform act would include “an expansive 
scope of rights” that are “both freely assignable and freely 
descendible” and would include provisions on the available 
remedies.246 Although her suggestion has substantial merit,247 it 
ignores the significance of the substantial variation among the 
laws enacted by various states.248 The states that recognize a 
right of publicity have defined this right according to their policy 
decisions, making it unlikely that these states will choose to 
abandon their traditional laws for a new act that combines 
snippets of various states’ laws.249 
Other scholars advocate for a federal right of publicity.250 
Alex Wyman argues that “the need for consistent federal 
treatment of [the right of publicity] is more urgent than ever 
                                                                                                     
considered in right of publicity cases in the video game context). 
 244. See Adkins, supra note 82, at 502 (asserting that the “confused and 
convoluted litigation” spawning from the current state-specific system mandates 
a uniform act). 
 245. Id. at 525. 
 246. Id. at 530, 534, 542. Although these are the primary features of 
Adkins’s suggestion, the proposal includes numerous specific provisions, 
definitions, and intricacies that Adkins borrows from the California, Indiana, 
and Tennessee right of publicity statutes. See id. at 528–45 (explaining precisely 
what Adkins’s uniform act would include and the importance of each provision). 
 247. See id. at 527 (explaining that a uniform act would offer “protection of 
federalism, . . . conservation of state legislative resources, . . . and the benefit of 
learning from the experience of other states”). 
 248. See supra Part II.D (describing the differences among a small sampling 
of state right of publicity statutes). 
 249. See Calvin R. Massey, Abstention and the Constitutional Limits of the 
Judicial Power of the United States, 1991 BYU L. REV. 811, 854–55 (1991) 
(noting the importance of public policy in the creation of state law and warning 
federal courts against forcing policy decisions on states). 
 250. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 154 (explaining that the right of 
publicity’s variation among states “has led many to call for a federal right of 
publicity statute”). 
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before.”251 Susannah Rooney suggests using the Lanham Act,252 
which governs federal trademark law, to administer the right of 
publicity.253 She argues that Congress has authority to regulate 
the right of publicity under the Commerce Clause and that it 
would be a “logical step” for the federal government to 
standardize the right of publicity because it already regulates 
other intellectual property rights.254 Rooney proposes that the 
Lanham Act approach would have three major benefits, similar to 
those envisioned by Adkins.255 She believes her proposal would 
reduce forum shopping,256 carve back some states’ expansive laws 
that protect “minute elements of a person’s identity,”257 and 
better protect First Amendment rights.258 Wyman expressly 
rejects Rooney’s suggestion, reasoning instead that the Lanham 
Act would be an “inadequate federal approach” for evaluating the 
right of publicity.259 
Sean Whaley also advocates for a federal right of publicity, 
albeit not specifically under the Lanham Act as Rooney 
                                                                                                     
 251. Wyman, supra note 25, at 173. He asserts that “we need a federal right 
of publicity not just to clarify the mess of laws on the subject, but also to 
restrain the right to prevent it from impinging on our constitutional rights any 
further.” Id. at 175. 
 252. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1114n (2012); see Rebecca Tushnet, Running the 
Gamut From A to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1305, 1309–13 (2011) (describing the history behind false advertising 
claims under the Lanham Act). 
 253. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 924 (proposing that this change is 
necessary in light of new technology and inconsistent and unpredictable 
application of state laws). 
 254. See id. at 945–46 (explaining the expansive scope of Congress’s 
Commerce Clause power and describing the similarities between the right of 
publicity and copyright, patent, and trademark law). 
 255. See id. at 924 (introducing these benefits as the principle reasons for 
regulating the right of publicity under the Lanham Act). 
 256. See id. at 934 (explaining that inconsistent domicile rules in states’ 
right of publicity laws leave forum shopping “uncorrected”). 
 257. Id. at 924. 
 258. See id. at 944 (contending that Rooney’s suggestion would allow 
Congress to protect the First Amendment by limiting the right of publicity). 
 259. See Wyman, supra note 25, at 171. Wyman rejects using the Lanham 
Act to evaluate right of publicity claims because many federal courts of appeals 
have already rejected using it and because the right of publicity and the 
Lanham Act “address very distinct problems.” Id. at 171–72. 
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suggests.260 Like Rooney, however, Whaley recognizes that the 
federal government currently regulates other intellectual 
property rights.261 Whaley also asserts that a federal right of 
publicity would advance both the right of publicity’s economic 
incentive to make a name for oneself and the moral right to 
develop one’s identity.262 Finally, he argues that federal 
regulation would reduce administrative costs and forum 
shopping.263 
Although their policy considerations are laudable, Rooney’s 
and Whaley’s suggested alternatives are flawed for two reasons. 
First, the right of publicity needs to remain with states because 
many individuals are well-known in some states but not in other 
states.264 A federal test would not account for different levels of 
familiarity to the same degree that the readily identifiable 
standard will.265 
Second, a federal right of publicity would encroach on state 
sovereignty.266 Under states’ police powers, each state has the 
authority to regulate the morality of its citizens.267 Even Whaley 
concedes that moral rights are “an important foundation of 
                                                                                                     
 260. See Whaley, supra note 70, at 259–60 (introducing Whaley’s proposed 
federal right of publicity). 
 261. See id. at 260 (explaining that the right of publicity, like the federally 
regulated trademark and unfair competition laws, “protect[s] the value of 
certain intangible property used in commerce”). 
 262. See id. at 261–65 (discussing economic and moral justifications for a 
federal right of publicity). 
 263. See id. at 266–67 (articulating the public policy advantages of a federal 
right of publicity). 
 264. See infra note 372 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of 
“regionally known personas”). 
 265. See Rooney, supra note 27, at 950–55 (explaining the specifics of 
Rooney’s proposal, which does not account for differing levels of familiarity with 
the celebrity); infra note 332 and accompanying text (explaining that the readily 
identifiable standard applies from the perspective of someone familiar with the 
individual in question). 
 266. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012) 
(explaining that the framers crafted state sovereignty, an essential element of a 
federalist system, to ensure that “the facets of governing that touch on citizens’ 
daily lives are normally administered by smaller governments closer to the 
governed”). 
 267. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (explaining that morality, 
along with public health and safety and other areas of regulation, fall within 
states’ traditional police powers). 
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publicity rights.”268 The right of publicity is a moral right because 
a company can violate it by using a celebrity’s likeness in 
conjunction with a product that the celebrity views as morally 
objectionable.269 Alternatively, a person may morally object to any 
appropriation of her likeness.270 A federal right of publicity would 
place the power to regulate this moral right with the federal 
government and thereby violate a foundational principle of the 
United States’ federalist system.271 Nineteen states do not 
recognize the right of publicity under either a statute or the 
common law.272 A federal right of publicity law would force a 
moral law on these states that their democratically elected state 
legislatures have declined to adopt themselves.273 
Joseph Gutmann has suggested an alternative to existing 
tests for the video game context.274 Using the lower court Hart 
and Keller opinions as a springboard, Gutmann advocates for a 
“redefined transformative test” that will be “simpler and better 
equipped to deal with . . . increased litigation” in the booming 
video game industry.275 The core of the redefined transformative 
                                                                                                     
 268. Whaley, supra note 70, at 271. Admittedly, Rooney disagrees. She 
argues that the elements of an individual’s “commercial value,” which the right 
of publicity protects, do not “fit[] neatly into an inherent moral right.” Rooney, 
supra note 27, at 927. 
 269. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 122–23 (explaining the multiple forms of 
moral objections that the right of publicity guards against). 
 270. See id. at 123 (listing examples of this type of general moral objection). 
 271. See Usha Rodrigues, Note, Race to the Stars: A Federalism Argument 
for Leaving the Right of Publicity in the Hands of the States, 87 VA. L. REV. 1201, 
1211 (2001) (noting the “elementary proposition” that the right of publicity falls 
under the rights governed by state law in a federalist society). 
 272. See supra notes 83–84 (listing the nineteen states that have right of 
publicity statutes and the twelve that recognize the right under common law). 
 273. See Rodrigues, supra note 271, at 1212 (arguing that a federal right of 
publicity would be “premature” until states reach more of a consensus on how 
much protection a right of publicity should confer). Rodrigues warns that 
adopting a federal right of publicity at this stage of the right’s development 
could result in “a model of persona protection that might cement into an 
unwieldy and oppressive regime.” Id. at 1227. 
 274. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 217 (introducing his test and the need 
for it). 
 275. Id. at 227. Gutmann emphasizes the increasing popularity of video 
games within unexpected demographics. He cites a 2011 study that provides 
that video and computer games are played in 72% of American households, that 
29% of video game players are over 50, and that 33% of video game players 
report gaming as their favorite computer activity. Id. at 226–27. 
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test is distinguishing video games that place characters in an 
“altered reality” from those that feature avatars in an “imitation 
of life.”276 A video game is in the altered reality category and is 
thus transformative “[e]ven if the likeness has similarities to an 
actual person, as long as the intention is for the likeness’[s] path 
in the game to be open to different scenarios from the ones 
present in the person’s life.”277 Gutmann cites Kirby as the 
“baseline” case in this category.278  
A game is an imitation of life and thus not sufficiently 
transformative if “the likeness’s intended path in the 
game . . . match[es] the path taken by the actual person in his or 
her life.”279 Gutmann extensively describes what factors courts 
should consider in making the classification, including the video 
game character’s environment and the “changeability” of 
avatars.280 He reasons that the changeability feature in Hart and 
Keller weighs toward altered reality classification, but concludes 
that the clear similarities between the games and reality put the 
NCAA Football games in the imitation of life category.281 
Gutmann’s work is commendable for its attempt to establish 
a standard that, if adopted, would help video game companies 
predict the outcome of litigation and would help courts reach 
consistent results.282 Gutmann’s suggestion also takes a step in 
the right direction by ignoring interactivity in determining 
                                                                                                     
 276. Id. at 227. 
 277. Id. at 228.  
 278. See id. at 229 (explaining that Kirby fits within the altered reality 
category because Ulala “was given a new environment, new characteristics[,] 
and a new profession”). 
 279. Id. at 231. Gutmann argues that no major case involves a clear 
imitation of life video game. Id. at 233. He asserts, however, that Hilton v. 
Hallmark Cards, 580 F.3d 874 (9th Cir. 2009), is a good non-video game 
illustration because it considered a greeting card that featured a photo of Paris 
Hilton doing exactly what she did on her television show The Simple Life. Id. 
 280. See id. at 228–38 (describing the altered reality and imitation of life 
categories in detail and using No Doubt to demonstrate how courts should apply 
the redefined transformative test). 
 281. See id. at 230–31 (evaluating the classification of Hart and Keller under 
the redefined transformative test). 
 282. See id. at 248 (explaining that Gutmann intended to resolve 
inconsistent opinions by creating a test that is “fair, easily applicable, and 
faithful to the ideas upon which [Comedy III’s transformative use test] was 
based”). 
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whether a video game violates the right of publicity.283 But his 
redefined transformative test has several serious flaws. First, the 
test’s changeability suggestion evades logic. Gutmann asserts 
that the user’s ability to alter characters makes a game 
transformative, but the Third Circuit observed in Hart that this 
feature, standing alone, cannot give a video game First 
Amendment protection.284 Instead, courts must evaluate video 
games in their default form.285 Second, the redefined 
transformative test’s use of a video game producer’s intent as an 
“integral piece”286 would be difficult to prove and thus contradicts 
Gutmann’s purpose of simplifying litigation.287 Third, it is 
possible to have a single game that has various game modes, 
some of which qualify as altered reality and others of which 
qualify as imitation of life.288 For example, the Hart and Keller 
courts noted that the NCAA Football games include the primary 
single game mode as well as a dynasty mode in which the user 
acts as a team’s coach.289 Gutmann would classify the former 
game mode as an imitation of life but the latter as an altered 
                                                                                                     
 283. See id. at 228 (explaining that the redefined transformative test would 
not consider interactivity). Gutmann’s reasoning on this point is straightforward 
and logical: “The fact that a user can control a character is not relevant, because 
control alone does not make any change to the work. It is the way that the 
character can be used, and whether such manner of use diverts from reality, 
that is key.” Id. 
 284. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (explaining that 
transformative elements beyond changeability are necessary to pass the 
transformative use test). 
 285. See infra Part V.B (explaining that evaluation in the default form is 
necessary to avoid giving video game companies an easy route around right of 
publicity liability). 
 286. Gutmann, supra note 25, at 235. 
 287. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing 
Discriminatory Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 733, 773–75 (1987) (outlining why it is so difficult for courts to determine 
intent). 
 288. See Mary Catherine Moore, Note, There is No “I” in NCAA: Why College 
Sports Video Games Do Not Violate College Athletes’ Rights of Publicity Such to 
Entitle Them to Compensation for Use of Their Likenesses, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 
269, 289 (2010) (recognizing the mix of realistic and fantasy game modes in 
video games). 
 289. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 175 (3d Cir. 2013) (outlining 
the various game modes); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271–72 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). 
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reality.290 His redefined transformative test does not address how 
courts should categorize such games.291 
Finally, Charles Bahlert has proposed the “reality-mimicking 
predominant use test,” which is essentially a hybrid of the 
transformative use and predominant use tests.292 Bahlert’s test 
would instruct courts to consider six factors in evaluating video 
games:  
(1) The purpose and character of the use; (2) [e]vidence of 
intent; (3) [w]hether the use contains the actual name or 
likeness of the person versus more generalized indicia of 
identity; (4) [e]xtent of appropriation; (5) [e]xtent to which the 
person is distinctive or famous; [and] (6) [the d]efendant's 
prior dealings in same or similar circumstances.293  
Bahlert argues that considering intent is necessary to protect the 
right of publicity’s policy justifications.294 But, as explained 
below, considering intent is extremely subjective.295 Bahlert’s 
Brennan-like pragmatic approach thus muddies the 
transformative use test’s waters. 
V. A Better Alternative: The Readily Identifiable Standard 
This Part addresses the need for a workable solution by 
proposing the readily identifiable standard. Subpart A explains 
what an effective test must do, in part by highlighting the three 
existing tests’ flaws. Subpart B outlines in detail the specifics of 
the readily identifiable standard, including which of a game’s 
elements the test will and will not consider. Subpart B also 
explains how the new test aligns with public policy and how it 
                                                                                                     
 290. See supra notes 277–279 and accompanying text (defining the imitation 
of life and altered reality categories). 
 291. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 227 (explaining that Gutmann’s test is 
a “[m]ethod of delineation” that depends on a clear classification for each video 
game). 
 292. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 166 (explaining that Bahlert’s test 
“expand[s] the [t]ransformative [u]se [t]est to include a defendant's underlying 
purpose in using a person's likeness”). 
 293. Id. at 167. 
 294. See id. (discussing these justifications). 
 295. See infra notes 359–364 and accompanying text (explaining why the 
readily identifiable standard will ignore a video game producer’s intent). 
“GROOVE IS IN THE HART” 361 
differs from the transformative use test. Subpart C applies the 
readily identifiable standard to the cases discussed in Part III.B. 
A. Goals in Crafting a New Test 
It is easiest to illustrate what an effective test for analyzing 
right of publicity claims in the video game context must do by 
first examining and rehashing why the existing alternatives are 
problematic.296 The three existing alternatives all include aspects 
of what the proper test needs to do but each unfortunately lacks 
other necessary traits.297  
The Rogers test, as applied in the video game context, has 
several defects. First, the Second Circuit designed it to apply 
specifically to celebrities’ names in titles, not to video games or 
even to celebrities’ images.298 This Note does not intend to imply 
that courts should not apply the Rogers test outside of the movie 
title context. Courts have admittedly applied the test consistently 
and sensibly in Lanham Act claims.299 But the Third Circuit 
noted in Hart that the significant differences between the right of 
publicity and trademark law necessitate a different test for 
each.300 Second, the Rogers test is inappropriate for the right of 
publicity in the video game context because most video game 
cases involve a celebrity’s image.301 It is much harder for a court 
                                                                                                     
 296. See ALEXANDER LOWEN, BIOENERGETICS 30 (1994) (“No one is exempt 
from the rule that learning occurs through recognition of error.”).  
 297. See, e.g., Garon, supra note 145, at 505–06 (arguing that “[t]he Missouri 
predominant use test goes too far in requiring a direct reference to the 
particular celebrity as a prerequisite to protecting free expression interests” 
while “California[’s transformative use test] goes too far in excluding the market 
effect from publicity fair use analysis”). 
 298. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining that the Second 
Circuit limited its holding in Rogers to movie titles). 
 299. See Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235, 1243 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that the Rogers test is appropriate for evaluating Lanham Act 
claims because it properly evaluates artistic relevance); E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. 
v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (same). 
 300. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 158 (3d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
right of publicity is broader [than trademark protections] and, by extension, 
protects a greater swath of property interests. Thus, it would be unwise for us to 
adopt a test that hews so closely to traditional trademark principles.”). 
 301. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that the claims 
in all of Part III.B’s cases other than Romantics related to depictions of the 
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to determine whether a celebrity’s image is wholly unrelated to a 
video game’s content than it is to decide whether there is a 
sufficient link between a movie’s title and content.302 Third, the 
test “does not adequately account for the right’s strong policy 
rationales of rewarding moral rights and labor and preventing 
unjust enrichment” because it “favor[s] the First Amendment 
over the right of publicity in nearly every expressive scenario.”303 
Finally, it “fails to account for evidence of bad faith to 
commercially exploit a persona.”304 
The predominant use test’s fatal flaw is its inherently 
subjective nature.305 The Hart court accurately concluded that the 
test is “subjective at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case 
calls upon judges to act as both impartial jurists and discerning 
art critics.”306 The predominant use test also gives too much 
weight to the First Amendment. A video game company is 
unlikely to appropriate an individual’s likeness for the sheer 
purpose of doing so; rather, a company would do so for financial 
gain.307 But the predominant use test will protect all video games 
                                                                                                     
celebrities’ images). 
 302.  See 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 10:31 (4th ed. 1996) (asserting that the Rogers test is even inappropriate for 
the movie title context because it requires courts to make subjective judgments). 
 303. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 158. Bahlert acknowledges that the Rogers 
test succeeds at being a “bright-line test,” but he criticizes its “extremely low 
requirements.” Id. Gutmann suggests that this shortcoming makes the Rogers 
test “unfaithful to the original principles of the right of publicity.” Gutmann, 
supra note 25, at 220. 
 304. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 158. 
 305. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221 (explaining that the predominant 
use test is not a viable alternative because it “does not provide any guidance for 
determining what ‘predominant’ means”); Simcox, supra note 101, at 106–07 
(criticizing the subjective inquiry that the predominant use test requires and 
arguing that such analysis is especially dangerous “in cases involving the 
determination of the aesthetic or creative merit of expression”); Smedley, supra 
note 85, at 464 (noting that “recent courts have rejected [the predominant use 
test] on the basis that its results are too subjective and focus too much on the 
intended use of the celebrity's likeness rather than focusing on the work itself”); 
Recent Case, supra note 75, at 1218–19 (arguing that applying the predominant 
use test “inescapably requires judges to engage in the dubious task of making 
aesthetic judgments about creative works”). 
 306. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 154 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 307. See Pamela Lynn Kunath, Note and Comment, Lights, Camera, 
Animate! The Right of Publicity’s Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities, 29 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 863, 886–87 (1996) (explaining that appropriation of a 
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without that main intention, regardless of whether the game has 
an incidental effect of commercial exploitation.308 
The transformative use test is the most workable of the three 
tests, in large part because it can be summarized in a single 
sentence.309 Like the predominant use test, however, the 
transformative use test is “vague and unpredictable, as it 
depends wholly on whether the judge deems a work of art to have 
sufficient ‘creative contribution.’”310 In other words, the test is 
subjective and difficult to apply consistently as the contradicting 
district court rulings in Hart and Keller highlight.311 The 
inconsistencies promise to become more frequent as video game 
technology advances because this innovation will force more 
courts to select and apply a test.312  
The transformative use test also disregards “commercial 
components” and instead considers solely expression.313 This 
approach creates two problems. First, as the TCI Cablevision 
court explained, ignoring commercial aspects allows a video game 
producer to avoid liability for intentionally appropriating a 
                                                                                                     
celebrity’s likeness is motivated by commercial purposes). 
 308. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 221 n.47 (insisting that this permissive 
standard contradicts Zacchini’s “fundamental protective principle” that a 
famous person has a right to protect the fruits of his labor). Bahlert suggests 
that the “[t]est’s focus on a defendant's commercial purpose is arguably 
‘dangerous.’” Bahlert, supra note 24, at 160. 
 309. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 799 
(Cal. 2001) (describing the transformative use test as “essentially a balancing 
test between the First Amendment and the right of publicity based on whether 
the work in question adds significant creative elements so as to be transformed 
into something more than a mere celebrity likeness or imitation”). 
 310. Wyman, supra note 25, at 174. Wyman goes on to explain that “instead 
of helping define the First Amendment’s boundaries, this recent and increasing 
application of the transformative use test only blurs the lines.” Id. at 175. 
 311. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 165 (“Due in part to its subjectivity, the 
[t]ransformative [u]se [t]est inevitably leads to unpredictable results. The 
district court holdings in Keller and Hart support this phenomenon. Two judges, 
examining virtually identical facts, reached opposite conclusions.”); supra note 
26 (explaining that these distinct outcomes necessitate a more workable test). 
 312. See Gutmann, supra note 25, at 222 (“[Some cases] present significant 
problems when it comes to interpreting the [transformative use] test in light of 
this relatively new technology. . . . As the technology advances, issues . . . will 
only increase and the murky zone of video games will only get murkier.”). 
 313. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
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celebrity’s likeness.314 Second, “[f]ocusing on expression forces 
judges to make subjective decisions, which means the application 
of the test results in conflicting and unpredictable outcomes.”315 
Accordingly, Kyle Simcox argues that the transformative use test 
is “outdated” because it “fails to recognize the modern realities of 
video games.”316 He reasons that the process of creating video 
games is inherently creative, and a test that considers whether a 
game sufficiently transforms individuals’ likenesses is thus 
unusable.317  
A workable test needs to include considerations and 
components that correct the current tests’ imperfections. First, 
the test must apply specifically to the video game context.318 
Proper balancing of the right of publicity and the First 
Amendment depends on the specific medium that allegedly 
violates an individual’s right of publicity.319 The same test is thus 
not appropriate for evaluating a right of publicity claim based on 
a celebrity’s image in electronic entertainment and a right of 
publicity claim based on a movie or book title.320 This necessarily 
                                                                                                     
 314. See id. (rejecting the transformative use test for this reason); accord 
Garon, supra note 145, at 500 (arguing that the transformative use test “may 
allow for much greater exploitation of an actor or athlete’s identity than ha[s] 
been historically permitted” because the test “does not take the commercial 
nature of the use into account”). 
 315. Bahlert, supra note 24, at 151. 
 316. Simcox, supra note 101, at 119. 
 317. See id. (describing the transformative process of video game creation 
that companies design to give users a fantasy experience). 
 318. See Erika T. Olander, Comment, Stop the Presses! First Amendment 
Limitations of Professional Athletes’ Publicity Rights, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 
885, 898 (2002) (asserting that whether the First Amendment protects 
commercial use of a celebrity’s identity is “context-specific”). 
 319. See Bucher, supra note 26, at 2 (“[T]hough the balancing of right of 
publicity and First Amendment interests may seem straightforward to some, 
the context in which an individual claims that his right of publicity has been 
infringed changes the analysis.”); Wyman, supra note 25, at 174 (arguing that 
“these cases exponentially increase the chances that filmmakers, videogame 
creators, biographers, journalists and others will choose to censor themselves 
rather than risk liability from the nebulous right of publicity laws” and that 
“this self-censorship . . . is causing the right of publicity to infringe on First 
Amendment rights”). 
 320. See Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1015–16 (3d Cir. 
2008) (declining to apply the Rogers test to a right of publicity claim about a 
video game’s promotional video because the other circuits had applied it only in 
the context of book and movie titles, other than once regarding a book cover and 
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eliminates the possibility of adopting a test from another context 
as the Romantics and TCI Cablevision courts did.321 
Second, an effective standard must be capable of consistent 
application.322 A body of cases that consistently apply the same 
test will establish expectations that video game companies can 
rely on in creating new games.323 If companies have a better idea 
of when a game will violate someone’s right of publicity, logic 
dictates that the companies will not cross that line.324 As a result, 
fewer video games will violate celebrities’ rights of publicity, and 
litigation will decrease. 
Third, the test must account for consumer expectations only 
to the degree necessary in the video game context and thus allot 
the appropriate amount of First Amendment protection.325 There 
is a high risk of consumer confusion in video games.326 The 
“commercialized nature of celebrity endorsements” is responsible 
for this frequent confusion.327 But, as Jon Garon observes, the 
possibility of consumer confusion provides little incentive to 
reduce video game producers’ First Amendment rights because 
“audiences are not harmed by the confusion” in video games.328 
                                                                                                     
once regarding a painting). In the case Facenda references in which the Sixth 
Circuit adopted the Rogers test to evaluate a painting, the dissent notably 
argued that the majority should not have applied the Rogers test because 
previous courts limited their holdings to the context of titles. ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 944 (6th Cir. 2003) (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 321. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 768–69 
(E.D. Mich. 2008) (adopting the Rogers test in the video game context for the 
first time); Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(borrowing the predominant use test from an article by Mark Lee). 
 322. See Andreas N. Andrews, Note and Comment, Stop Copying Me: 
Rethinking Rights of Publicity Verses the First Amendment, 32 TEMP. J. SCI. 
TECH. & ENVTL. L. 127, 129 (2013) (arguing that a single test is needed for 
“consistency and efficiency”). 
 323. See id. (insisting that a single test is needed to allow “video game 
companies . . . [to] tailor their artistic creations around a consistent application 
of the law”). 
 324. See Theodore C. Stamatakos, Note, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, 
Tort Liability and the Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 480 (1990) 
(noting that “[t]he essence of deterrence is predictability”). 
 325. See Blanke, supra note 24, at 35, 44, 55–56 (illustrating the controversy 
surrounding video games’ First Amendment rights). 
 326. See supra note 80 and accompanying text (identifying this risk). 
 327. Garon, supra note 145, at 498. 
 328. Id. 
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Whereas a consumer is likely to buy or use a book, movie, or 
video game based on its name, a video game user will usually 
decide to play a game before ever seeing what its characters look 
like.329 Consumer confusion is thus less important in the context 
of a video game’s avatars than in the context of a title or a similar 
circumstance in which a consumer decides to buy or use a product 
based on appropriation of a celebrity’s likeness. Video game 
avatars should thus receive more First Amendment protection 
than the titles and similar external components of a work.330 
B. The Readily Identifiable Standard Explained 
This Note contends that a different test could better address 
these goals. By both necessity and design, the readily identifiable 
standard can be simplified in a single sentence:331 A video game 
violates an individual’s right of publicity if a person familiar with 
the individual would look at a video game character and know 
immediately that the character is definitively based on the real 
individual.332 Conversely, a video game deserves First 
Amendment protection if the individual’s likeness is not both 
immediately and definitively obvious. Although most right of 
publicity cases in the video game context deal with a celebrity’s 
image,333 the readily identifiable standard can also apply to a 
video game’s other elements. For example, a video game will 
                                                                                                     
 329. See id. (explaining that consumer confusion in video games does not 
affect users’ choice to buy or play the game because “[t]he audience member’s 
choice to read, watch, or play has already been made”). 
 330. See id. (arguing that there should be an inverse relationship between 
the importance of consumer confusion and the amount of First Amendment 
deference given to creative works); see also Edelman, supra note 53, at 586 
(arguing that “courts must recognize that the scales of justice point in favor of 
protecting college athletes’ publicity rights in commercial video games”). 
 331. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (noting the importance of 
simplicity in a test). 
 332. See infra note 340 and accompanying text (explaining that some courts 
have already been evaluating right of publicity claims from the perspective of 
someone familiar with the plaintiff). 
 333. See supra note 172 and accompanying text (noting that Romantics is an 
exception to this trend because it involves a right of publicity claim relating to 
sound). 
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violate a celebrity’s right of publicity if the celebrity’s song is 
immediately and definitively recognizable in the game. 
The readily identifiable standard borrows the term “readily 
identifiable” from Motschenbacher, which used the phrase in 
describing how the plaintiff customized his race cars.334 But the 
real source of the test is Judge Alarcon’s dissent in White.335 
Although he does not use the words “readily identifiable,” Judge 
Alarcon discusses both Motschenbacher and Carson at length and 
effectively applies the readily identifiable standard.336 He 
ultimately concludes, “It is patently clear to anyone viewing the 
commercial advertisement that Vanna White was not being 
depicted. No reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with 
Vanna White.”337 Because it is not immediately and definitively 
clear that the advertisement is based on White’s image—
particularly because the figure is a robot in the advertisement 
and because there are distinct differences between the picture’s 
background and the Wheel of Fortune game set338—Judge 
                                                                                                     
 334. See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 822 
(9th Cir. 1974) (describing how the plaintiff used a “distinctive narrow white 
pinstripe” to make his cars “more readily identifiable”). The Sixth Circuit quoted 
the phrase in a discussion of Motschenbacher nearly a decade later. See Carson 
v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 844 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(discussing Motschenbacher in determining whether a portable toilets company 
violated an entertainer’s right of publicity through use of his nickname in the 
corporation’s name). 
 335. See supra notes 125–127 (discussing Judge Alarcon’s dissent and his 
reasoning). 
 336. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1403–04 (9th 
Cir. 1992) (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (noting that there were many more 
similarities between the images and celebrities in Motschenbacher and Carson 
than in White). 
 337. Id. at 1404. In his dissent to the denial of the petition for rehearing en 
banc, Judge Kozinski echoed Judge Alarcon’s reasoning. See White v. Samsung 
Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (9th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the majority went too far by “not allowing any means 
of reminding people of someone”). Although Judge Alarcon applies his standard 
from the perspective of “anyone,” his logic implies that the viewer would need 
some familiarity with Vanna White. His reasoning is thus consistent with the 
readily identifiable standard. See supra note 332 and accompanying text 
(clarifying that the readily identifiable standard applies from the position of a 
person who is familiar with the celebrity). 
 338. See White, 971 F.2d at 1405 (contending that the robot’s image is 
clearly distinct from White’s and asserting that “[t]he Wheel of Fortune 
set . . . is not an attribute of Vanna White’s identity”). 
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Alarcon’s opinion is a great example of applying the readily 
identifiable standard. 
Additional precedent supports the readily identifiable 
standard, although not necessarily its “immediately” and 
“definitively” language or its application in the video game 
context. In Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc.,339 a right of privacy 
case, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that a photograph 
violates an individual’s right of privacy only if “someone familiar 
with the person[] in the photograph could identify them by 
looking at [it].”340 The court explained that this determination 
requires a court to consider how clear the person’s image is and 
any other features in the picture that help show whether it does 
or does not depict the individual.341 It determined that the 
photograph of a nude mother and child was similar enough to the 
plaintiffs’ images to justify the jury’s determination.342 The New 
York Supreme Court later applied the Cohen test in a right of 
publicity case.343 The court concluded that the defendant, a 
baseball jersey manufacturer, violated New York Mets players’ 
rights of publicity because someone familiar with the plaintiffs 
could identify their images on the jersey at issue.344 
It is easiest to highlight the readily identifiable standard’s 
intricacies by explaining what factors a court applying the test 
                                                                                                     
 339. 472 N.E.2d 307 (N.Y. 1984). 
 340. Id. at 308; see also Eames, supra note 48, at 52 (citing Cohen in the 
process of explaining how courts resolve right of publicity issues involving non-
celebrities). Many courts use this “someone familiar with” principle, which the 
readily identifiable standard adopts, to evaluate right of publicity claims. See, 
e.g., Cheatham v. Paisano Publ’ns, Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381, 387 (W.D. Ky. 1995) 
(explaining that the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim hinged on whether “her 
friends and customers” could identify her from the photograph). 
 341. See Cohen, 472 N.E.2d at 309 (explaining that the result “will 
necessarily depend upon the court’s determination of the quality and quantity of 
the identifiable characteristics displayed in the advertisement and . . . an 
assessment of the clarity of the photograph, the extent to which identifying 
features are visible, and the distinctiveness of those features”). 
 342. See id. (noting similarities between the plaintiffs’ physical features and 
those in the photograph and reasoning that the plaintiffs were more identifiable 
because they were together in the photograph). 
 343. See Shamsky v. Garan, Inc., 632 N.Y.S.2d 930, 933–34 (1995) (citing 
Cohen and quoting its standard). 
 344. See id. at 934 (describing the similarities between the players and the 
image on the jersey and explaining that baseball fans, as persons familiar with 
the plaintiffs, could identify them from the jersey). 
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will and will not consider. In short, the standard will consider all 
of a video game’s features that can be seen and heard but will not 
consider nonobservable components that do not help determine 
whether an individual’s likeness is immediately and definitively 
identifiable. In the context of an individual’s image, for example, 
the readily identifiable standard will consider a game’s setting 
and an avatar’s surroundings. The game board scene in White, if 
the advertisement had been part of a video game, is a prime 
example of such a setting.345 A court applying this test would 
have also considered the space-age setting of Space Channel 5 in 
Kirby346 and the impressively lifelike stadiums in Hart and Keller 
that are filled with countless realistic avatars.347 
The readily identifiable standard will also consider an 
avatar’s unique characteristics because these aid in the decision 
of whether an avatar is immediately and definitively based on a 
right of publicity plaintiff. For example, the height, weight, and 
biographical information given in the NCAA Football games helps 
show what athlete an avatar is based on, even in the absence of a 
name.348 If the White advertisement were in a video game, a court 
applying the readily identifiable standard would consider the 
robot’s dress and jewelry that resembled those that White wore in 
real life.349 
Finally, this new test will consider the sounds made and 
actions taken by a video game’s avatars. A court applying the 
readily identifiable standard would thus consider what songs No 
Doubt sang in Band Hero, just as the court that applied the 
transformative use test did.350 If Ginger Rogers were in a video 
                                                                                                     
 345. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (explaining that the White 
court considered the game show scene). 
 346. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (describing how the game is set in the 2400s). 
 347. See In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. 
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013) (identifying the presence of 
“realistic virtual versions of actual stadiums” filled with “virtual athletes, 
coaches, cheerleaders, and fans”). 
 348. See supra note 197 (describing the similarities between characters in 
the NCAA Football games and the athletes in real life). 
 349. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 
1992) (noting the similarity between the robot’s clothing and accessories and 
those of Vanna White). 
 350. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1034 
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game, a court applying the readily identifiable standard would 
consider her dancing style.351 A court using this test would also 
consider a baseball player’s batting stance, a celebrity’s famous 
expressions, and an individual’s tattoos352 because these too 
factor into the immediately and definitively identifiable analysis. 
The readily identifiable standard will not consider a video 
game’s components that a user cannot observe. Examples include 
the ability to alter characters, settings, and other aspects of the 
game.353 As the Third Circuit reasoned in Hart, changing a video 
game’s avatar creates a new character.354 Likewise, the readily 
identifiable standard will ignore interactivity—a user’s ability to 
control an avatar and the avatar’s activity.355 Interactivity does 
not change the avatar’s potential appropriation of an individual’s 
likeness and is thus not appropriate for evaluating a right of 
publicity claim.356 Considering either changeability or 
interactivity is also a problem because doing so would provide 
video game producers an easy avenue around right of publicity 
                                                                                                     
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that No Doubt in Band Hero sang songs that 
the real band maintained it would never have sung).  
 351. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (explaining that Rogers 
became famous for dancing with Fred Astaire in films). 
 352. Meredith Hatic argues that tattoos can be a large part of a person’s 
likeness that the right of publicity must protect. See Meredith Hatic, Note, Who 
Owns Your Body Art?: The Copyright and Constitutional Implications of Tattoos, 
23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 396, 420 (2012) (asserting that the 
right of publicity gives former NBA star Rasheed Wallace an interest to protect 
his image, which includes his tattoos). 
 353. See Bahlert, supra note 24, at 168 (“[T]he mere ability to change the 
virtual players’ appearances should not . . . end the analysis where the intent of 
the game makers is to mimic reality.”). 
 354. See supra notes 219–220 and accompanying text (explaining the court’s 
reasoning about minor and major alterations of video game characters). A video 
game user’s creation of an avatar that closely resembles a famous person has no 
right of publicity consequences as the user will not profit from the celebrity’s 
likeness. See Rodrigues, supra note 271, at 1202 (“The right of publicity is a 
property right in the commercial use of one’s persona.” (emphasis added)). 
 355. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2767–77 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining the interactive component of video games 
and arguing that interactivity distinguishes video games from movies and 
books). 
 356. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (explaining Gutmann’s 
argument that courts should not consider the ability to control video game 
avatars in balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment because it 
does not change the avatar). 
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liability.357 The companies could simply incorporate these 
features into a game, which would be “merely a guise to escape 
liability.”358 Courts must thus evaluate a video game in its default 
form and without giving any weight to interactivity or 
changeability.359 
A video game producer’s intent is another component that 
users cannot observe and that courts applying the readily 
identifiable standard will not consider. In Zacchini, the Supreme 
Court of the United States rejected the Ohio Supreme Court’s 
right of publicity test that had considered intent.360 Although the 
TCI Cablevision court argued that ignoring intent might allow 
video game companies to escape liability for intentional 
appropriation,361 any depiction of an individual that does not 
violate that person’s right of publicity under the readily 
identifiable standard is not appropriation at all.362 The new test 
thus avoids the problem TCI Cablevision anticipated.363 Lastly, 
determining a video game producer’s intent is extremely difficult 
to discern364 and may sometimes require a trier of fact to guess as 
to the producer’s intent.365 
                                                                                                     
 357. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 167 (3d Cir. 2013) (explaining 
that it is dangerous to consider the ability to alter avatars in right of publicity 
cases). 
 358. Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 454 (6th Cir. 2003); see Hart, 
717 F.3d at 167 (warning that changeability alone cannot give a video game 
First Amendment protection because this would “open[ ] the door to cynical 
abuse” as “video game companies could commit the most blatant acts of 
misappropriation only to absolve themselves by including a feature that allows 
users to modify the digital likenesses”). 
 359. See supra notes 284–285 and accompanying text (explaining the need 
for evaluation in the default form). 
 360. See Zacchini v. Scripps–Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 565 (1977) 
(explaining that the Ohio Supreme Court incorrectly considered whether the 
television station intended to appropriate Zacchini’s likeness). 
 361. See Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 374 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(arguing that balancing the right of publicity and the First Amendment requires 
considering intent). 
 362. See Bucher, supra note 26, at 1–2 (explaining that appropriation 
requires using an individual’s identity to one’s own advantage). 
 363. See supra note 151 and accompanying text (explaining the TCI 
Cablevision court’s fear of willful commercial exploitation). 
 364. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (describing the challenging 
task of discerning intent).  
 365. See Gerald Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First 
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The readily identifiable standard advances the goals of a 
workable test discussed in Part V.A and other public policy 
concerns in three ways. First, the test allocates the proper 
amount of First Amendment protection.366 The readily 
identifiable standard is strict by design.367 As noted above, video 
game companies should receive significant First Amendment 
protection because there is a low risk that consumers will decide 
to use or buy a game based on how the game depicts celebrities.368 
Entertainment is one of the primary means of expression under 
the First Amendment, and celebrities are in the unique, and 
arguably unenviable, position of often being the subjects of this 
expression.369 A balancing test, like the readily identifiable 
standard, that favors creativity is not intended to allow video 
game producers to exploit celebrities.370 The test is, however, 
designed to protect the freedom of expression that “is 
fundamental in our society” in an arena where policy favors First 
Amendment protection.371 
Second, the readily identifiable standard protects the average 
person who is equally entitled to a right of publicity if her state 
recognizes the right.372 Noncelebrities, although not recognizable 
                                                                                                     
Amendment Doctrine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719, 740 
(1975) (warning of the “risks to speech if juries were permitted to punish on the 
basis of guesses about intent”). 
 366. See supra note 325 and accompanying text (advocating that a workable 
test must properly consider the First Amendment). 
 367. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 63 (asserting that the proper balance 
between the First Amendment and moral rights like the right of publicity 
requires “a ‘thumb on the scales’ in favor of free speech”). 
 368. See supra notes 328–330 and accompanying text (contending that the 
low risk of consumer confusion as compared with titles of works necessitates 
additional First Amendment protection for video games). 
 369. See Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 803 
(Cal. 2001) (explaining that the way that people view celebrities can  make “the 
creative appropriation of celebrity images . . . an important avenue of individual 
expression”). 
 370. See BLACK, supra note 70, at 119–20 (warning of the danger that would 
result from overexploitation of celebrities’ images). 
 371. Id. at 134. 
 372. See KWALL, supra note 47, at 129 (arguing that the right of publicity 
protects, “at a minimum the names and likenesses of every individual” because 
celebrities and non-celebrities alike can be identified by their names and 
likenesses). The fact that courts designed the right of publicity to protect 
celebrities, supra note 49, does not preclude the right from also protecting non-
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on a national or international scale, have “regionally known 
personas.”373 The readily identifiable standard protects these 
personas by applying specifically from the perspective of “a 
person familiar with the individual.”374 
Finally, the readily identifiable standard gives video game 
companies a workable standard that they can rely on.375 The 
answer to the question of whether an individual is immediately 
and definitively identifiable from an avatar is easier to predict 
than the answer to whether the work is sufficiently 
transformative or whether creative aspects of the game 
predominate.376 And, significantly, protecting video game 
producers in this way will in turn protect celebrities. A video 
game company’s knowledge of what line it cannot cross protects 
celebrities because the fear of lawsuits will deter the company 
from crossing this line.377 
C. Applying the Readily Identifiable Standard to Existing 
Precedent 
This Note does not, in the absence of a complete factual 
record, purport to predict for certain how a court applying the 
readily identifiable standard would decide the cases outlined in 
Part III.B. Applying the test’s guidelines to these decisions can, 
nevertheless, help to clarify how a court would likely apply this 
                                                                                                     
celebrities. Ann Margaret Eames clarifies that celebrity status is not a 
requirement for bringing a right of publicity claim. See Eames, supra note 48, at 
51 (explaining that the right of publicity presently protects celebrities and non-
celebrities alike, although previous courts would have rejected a non-celebrity’s 
right of publicity action because “her image [was] fungible”). 
 373. KWALL, supra note 47, at 128. 
 374. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (explaining that the readily 
identifiable standard applies from this viewpoint). 
 375. See supra notes 323–324 and accompanying text (noting the need for a 
consistent standard that video game producers can put their faith in). 
 376. See supra notes 305–306, 311 (explaining that both the predominant 
use test and transformative use test are too subjective and difficult to apply 
consistently). 
 377. See Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: The 
Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on Non–Practicing Entities, 12 U. PITT. J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 7 (2011) (noting that the fear of possible litigation deters 
production in the intellectual property arena). 
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test and what factors a court would consider in analyzing these 
decisions. 
The most significant factor in applying the readily 
identifiable standard to Kirby’s facts is the tremendous difference 
in appearance between Ulala and Kierin Kirby.378 The Kirby 
court identified significant contrasts, including size, fashion style, 
and Ulala being an anime character.379 Beyond these differences 
in appearance, the “futuristic setting”380 weighs against Kirby.381 
Finally, the difference between Kirby’s “Groove is in the Heart” 
and the music in Space Channel 5 decreases the likelihood of 
associating Kirby with Ulala.382 These differences make it 
probable that Kirby’s likeness is not immediately and definitively 
identifiable from Ulala’s image. 
It is harder to analyze Guitar Hero Encore: Rocks the 80s, the 
game at issue in Romantics, because the court did not extensively 
compare the band’s original song with the game’s version.383 
Romantics also presents an unusual case because the game 
acknowledges that the song belongs to The Romantics.384 The 
Romantics court notes that this gives users notice that The 
Romantics are not performing “What I Like About You” in the 
game.385 This reasoning aligns with the readily identifiable 
standard because this disclaimer would make it less likely that a 
user would be able to immediately and definitively identify The 
Romantics from the band in the game.386 Because the band did 
                                                                                                     
 378. See Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 144 Cal. App. 4th 47, 59–60 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2006) (describing the differences in appearance). 
 379. See id. at 59 (explaining that Ulala and Kirby “differ quite a bit”). 
 380. Id. at 51. 
 381. See supra note 346 and accompanying text (explaining that a court 
applying the readily identifiable standard would consider Space Channel 5’s 
setting). 
 382. See Kirby, 144 Cal. App. 4th at 51 (explaining that Space Channel 5’s 
theme song “Mexican Flyer,” by Ken Woodman, is not associated with Kirby or 
her band Deee-Lite). 
 383. See Romantics v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 758, 765 (E.D. 
Mich. 2008) (noting that the band “presented no evidence that their sound is 
identifiable separate from the [s]ong”). 
 384. See id. at 762 (noting that the game displays the words “as made 
famous by The Romantics”). 
 385. See id. (asserting that this disclaimer “informs players and onlookers 
that The Romantics are not actually performing the [s]ong”). 
 386. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (stressing the difficulty of 
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not point to any visual similarities between itself and the band in 
the game,387 it is unlikely that the two were visually similar. 
Additionally, a court applying the readily identifiable standard 
would not consider the user’s ability to “customize [the] game 
play experience” as the Romantics court did.388 The factors thus 
seem to weigh against The Romantics and toward First 
Amendment protection for the game, just as the court held under 
the predominant use test.389 
No Doubt is an atypical case because the band members 
agreed to appear in the game before later alleging that Activision 
violated the licensing agreement.390 Activision thus likely violated 
the plaintiffs’ rights of publicity under the readily identifiable 
standard if the band members were not immediately and 
definitively identifiable from their avatars.391 Whether the 
avatars resembled the real band members was not an issue.392 
But a court applying the readily identifiable standard to these 
facts would still evaluate the game’s other elements.393 For 
example, a court would consider that a Band Hero user can make 
No Doubt “perform at fanciful venues including outer space or to 
sing songs [that No Doubt] would object to singing” because these 
are observable features.394 The readily identifiable standard 
would also consider, however, that the avatars performed solely 
rock songs just as No Doubt did in real life.395 It makes no 
                                                                                                     
satisfying this test). 
 387. See Romantics, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 765 (clarifying that the plaintiffs’ 
claim related to sound). 
 388. Id. at 766. 
 389. See id. (concluding that the plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim failed). 
 390. See No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 4th 1018, 1022 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining No Doubt’s claim that the video game publisher 
used the members’ likenesses in ways that violated the agreement). 
 391. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (clarifying that a court will 
normally apply the test by asking whether the plaintiff is immediately and 
definitively identifiable). 
 392. See No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1033 (noting that Activision 
acknowledged the intentional visual similarities). 
 393. See supra Part V.B (explaining that a court applying the readily 
identifiable standard would consider all of a game’s observable components). 
 394. No Doubt, 192 Cal. App. 4th at 1034. 
 395. See id. (observing that the game’s avatars do exactly what made No 
Doubt famous). 
376 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 317 (2015) 
difference under the readily identifiable standard that the game 
does not permit users to change the avatars.396 The band 
members would thus likely succeed under this test if the 
differences in setting, style, and song choice outweighed the 
visual resemblances to the extent that the plaintiffs were not 
immediately and definitively identifiable. 
Hart and Keller are likely the easiest of these five cases 
under the readily identifiable standard. The NCAA Football 
games include many observable components that a court applying 
the test would consider.397 First, visual similarities between the 
avatars and real athletes, supplemented by the biographical 
information, go a long way toward immediate and definitive 
identification.398 Second, the games place avatars in the “very 
setting” that the real athletes appear.399 Unlike the unrealistic 
venues in No Doubt, the NCAA Football games include few 
fictional elements.400 Third, other recognizable avatars surround 
a player, which makes identification easier.401 
Although the NCAA Football video games feature various 
game modes,402 the readily identifiable standard evaluates a 
game in its default form.403 In the NCAA Football series, this is 
                                                                                                     
 396. See id. at 1033 (noting that Band Hero lacks a changeability feature); 
supra notes 357–358 and accompanying text (explaining why the readily 
identifiable standard does not consider changeability). 
 397. See supra Part III.B.4 (identifying many of the games’ observable 
contents). 
 398. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text (describing the realistic 
depictions of Hart and Keller in NCAA Football 2005); supra note 348 and 
accompanying text (explaining that the test would consider these features 
because they are easily observable). 
 399. In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig. 
(Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 400. See Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 166 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(distinguishing Hart from No Doubt by noting that “the various digitized sights 
and sounds in [NCAA Football] do not alter or transform [Hart’s] identity in a 
significant way”). 
 401. See supra note 342 (explaining that the Cohen court weighed the 
presence of other identifiable individuals in the plaintiffs’ favor). 
 402. See supra notes 201–202 and accompanying text (explaining two of the 
game modes). 
 403. See supra note 358–359 and accompanying text (rationalizing that 
evaluation in the default form averts the problem of video game companies 
avoiding liability by including a changeability feature).  
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the traditional single game mode.404 The games’ changeability 
feature will not save Electronic Arts under the readily 
identifiable standard as it nearly did in Hart.405 A court applying 
this test would thus likely reach the same result as the Third and 
Ninth Circuits did in Hart and Keller and reject Electronic Arts’ 
First Amendment defense.406 
VI. Conclusion 
The right of publicity’s current direction in video game cases 
necessitates change. Courts have inconsistently, illogically, and 
unjustifiably applied the right of publicity in these cases. Current 
tests do not adequately consider the First Amendment, resulting 
in a group of video game cases that are somewhat consistent but 
are foundationally wrong. Scholars’ suggested adaptations to 
these tests represent modest improvements at best. Having a 
black and white test that courts can easily apply in the same way 
to all video games is the optimal situation. Such a test would 
obviate the need for any discussion on the issue and even for this 
Note itself. The fact-specific nature of each video game, however, 
unfortunately makes this ideal scenario impracticable.407 
The readily identifiable standard is the next best thing. It is 
workable, predictable, and protects video game companies’ First 
Amendment rights. By considering video games’ observable 
features while ignoring their invisible characteristics like 
changeability and intent, the readily identifiable standard 
returns to what the Haelan court designed the right of publicity 
to protect. States need to adopt this test before the increasing 
                                                                                                     
 404. See Hart, 717 F.3d at 146 (describing the other game modes as 
“additional game modes” that have each been part of a newer version of the 
game). 
 405. See id. at 166–69 (discussing the ability to alter avatars in detail after 
noting that Electronic Arts would have little, if any, defense if the games had no 
changeability feature). 
 406. See id. at 170 (concluding that the First Amendment did not protect the 
NCAA Football games); In re NCAA Student–Athlete Name & Likeness 
Licensing Litig. (Keller), 724 F.3d 1268, 1284 (9th Cir. 2013) (same). 
 407. See Matthew J. Mitten, A Triple Play for the Public Domain: Delaware 
Lottery to Motorola to C.B.C., 11 CHAP. L. REV. 569, 579 n.71 (2008) (noting that 
the right of publicity analysis in the video game context is particularly difficult 
because the balancing will be somewhat different in every case). 
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number of video games causes this problem to get out of hand. If 
states do adopt the readily identifiable standard, future courts 
will have a much easier time evaluating the next Kierin Kirby or 
Ryan Hart’s right of publicity claim. 
